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Abstract
Society and institutions of government reinforce norms that constrain the behavior
of individuals. Heteropatriarchal norms traditionally favor the perspective of white, male,
heterosexual, reason, judicial restraint, and democratic authority over their binary, and
minority, counterparts: black, female, homosexual, desire, judicial activism, and
individual rights. According to the theory of Queer New Institutionalism, these
dichotomous pairs are mutually dependent upon each other for definition and
maintenance. The perpetuation of these binarisms is made through language, often
assumed and unquestioned. However, the use of sexualized language and metaphors are
identified in efforts to draw suspicion and consternation for these minoritized Others.
When the presence of an Other is missing, those that would reinforce these norms being
to skirt the line between the pairings, taking the position of the individual they would
otherwise criticize. By utilizing critical discourse analysis, Supreme Court nomination
hearings during the 109th and 111th Congresses were reviewed for support for the theory
of Queer New Institutionalism. Senators and witnesses before the committee operated
within the constraints of binary thinking and instances of sexualized and gendered
language, as well as metaphors, were used to perpetuate these norms and link the
nominees to the suspicion surrounding Others.
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1. Introduction & Literature Review
If one were to pay attention to Supreme Court nomination hearings before the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, they would be inclined to notice that
among the discussions regarding prior and potential cases, conversations about stare
decisis, and emphasis on judicial qualifications, a large portion of the debate contains the
underlying theme concerning judicial activism versus judicial restraint. On the one hand,
activism is associated with all potential negative things that could come from a Supreme
Court justice: overturning precedent, making decisions based on personal policy
preferences, and ignoring the Constitution (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 446:00; U.S. Senate
2009, 35). On the other, restraint represents the ideal position which it is hoped that all
potential justices will anchor themselves: fidelity to the law, narrow decision-making,
and respect for precedent and the Constitution (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 443:00; U.S. Senate
2009, 59, 79; Wechsler 1959, 19).
This study will review the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees
during the 109th and 111th Congresses and examine language for support for
institutionalized normative behavior. Instances of gendered and sexualized language, as
well as the use of metaphors, will be identified to show the power Senators exert to
reinforce expected and assumed norms on the part of nominees. Even though judicial
activism/judicial restraint is the most prevalent binary pair exhibited throughout the
nomination proceedings, a number of pairings exist and function to reinforce expected
behaviors: male/female, white/black, heterosexual/homosexual, reason/desire, democratic
authority/individual rights. These binary pairs are linked by underlying assumptions
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regarding sexuality and desire (Burgess 1999, 203, 213). Identifying language during
nomination hearings that maintains thinking within these dichotomous terms will show
how normative behavior, and expectations of it, influence politics on a practical level.
However, upon closer inspection, the relative incoherence of the term “judicial
activism” eventually arises. It is applied to both conservative and liberal justices, from
Democratic and Republican senators alike. This illustrates the predicament the debate
encounters when it is limited by the construction of dichotomous terms judicial restraint
and judicial activism. This pairing, or binarism, is one among many that constrains
government and its institutions. It represents an asymmetrical power relationship, with
each term mutually dependent on the other to define itself. The reinforcement of
binarisms perpetuates the status quo, favoring traditional heteropatriarchal values (Butler
1990, 3, 31, 39; Sedgwick 10-11; Burgess 1999, 202-207).
Problem
The use of dichotomous pairs in characterizing the behavior of Supreme Court
justices is constraining and obscures the debate, eliminating consideration of any
alternatives that are outside of such binarisms (Burgess 1999, 201, 213; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009, 143). Such categorizations assume that there is an objective approach to
interpreting the United States Constitution, and judicial restraint is assumed to be the
default position, dominant to its lesser alternative, judicial activism (Burgess 1999, 200201, 205). This is similar to arguments furthered by queer theorists, as well as feminists
and critical race theorists, by examining and deconstructing a wide variety of
relationships to understand their underlying assumptions and the power exchange
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between the categorizations assumed to be natural (Burgess 1999, 201; Jagose 1996, 1618; Butler 1990, 3, 31, 46).
An examination of Supreme Court nomination hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee utilizing the theory of Queer New Institutionalism allows for a
critical examination of the heterosexist construction that serves as a basis for our social
institutions (Jagose 1996, 17). It takes key elements from queer theory, arguing that the
theoretical categorizations established and perpetuated in society, such as strict gender
roles, are deficient and cease to function properly when practically applied (Burgess
1999, 213). Likewise, a New Institutionalist perspective takes into account attitudes,
norms, influences, etc., that might also influence what occurs in regards to the
nomination hearings (Gillman & Clayton 1999, 4). Therefore, a Queer New
Institutionalist perspective in analyzing recent Supreme Court nomination hearings will
allow for a critical examination by deconstructing the conversation between senators and
nominees. The underlying assumptions can be revealed, illuminating how they influence
and impact the direction of the hearings.
Questions
This study will attempt to answer the following research questions:
What are the underlying sexual themes that permeate nomination hearings for judges and
justices before the Senate Judiciary Committee?
How are the heterosexist norms that are present in discussions regarding constitutional
theory reinforced through nomination hearings?
What is the effect of the persistence of institutionalized heterosexist norms?
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As queer theorists charge, theoretical categorizations of gender will ultimately
break down when applied in practice. This is due to the inevitable arising of individuals
that prove to be exceptions to the rule and cannot be easily classified by the strict
constructions of male or female (among other dichotomous pairings) (Butler 1990, 39;
Burgess 1999, 213). Likewise, following a Queer New Institutionalist perspective, one
could hypothesize that categorizations into judicial activism versus judicial restraint
would be faulty in practice, as individuals and situations could arise where the strict
categories do not hold. Failings in practice might not preclude the influence that the
theoretical categorizations have upon practical matters. Supreme Court nomination
hearings are a prime environment for the debate regarding judicial activism versus
restraint, and along with all the other constraining dichotomous pairings can be
questioned and investigated.
Heteropatriachal norms and the persistence of sexism
Society is constructed and reliant upon assumptions regarding how it is and
should be ordered. The family serves as the basis for this, with heterosexual marriages
constituting the bases for these units. They are traditionally dominated by men and are
perpetuated through replication over time. Burgess argues that this arrangement is
assumed to be natural, given, and universal (Burgess 1999, 203). It serves as the basis for
society, the nation, and onwards.
In an article titled “Sexism in Naming the World: Consciousness in a Patriarchal
Iceberg,” authors Martel and Peterat (1984) argue that patriarchal structures of power are
so preeminent in our world, that they are barely noticed. This is also reflected in

5
language, where men also maintain privilege. For example, words frequently used to
describe women have negative connotations, such as chick, witch, bitch, etc. and are
abundant in language (46-47). Their argument is that this acceptance of power structures
and connotations assigned different roles for men and women reinforce a subtle
legitimization of the existing power structures. Our language containing these sexist
terms helps to enable patriarchal structures (Martel and Peterat 1984, 48).
Martel and Peterat’s article convincingly makes the case that patriarchal
assumptions in language dominate. Not only do they serve to reinforce the assumed
subservient position of women, but those of blacks as well. Language connects persisting
ideas about religion and myths with personal practices and beliefs:
“Just like the slave who confesses to being ‘no good’ because she or he has learned to gauge
personal worth according to the master’s (seldom mistress’) definition of a ‘good slave’, we use a
language which constantly judges our second rate worth – or worthlessness.” (Martel and Peterat
1984, 49)

The emergence of queer theory has given impetus for changing the questions
asked in regards to gender and studies of sexuality. As McElhinny (2002) argues in her
article, “Language, Sexuality and Political Economy,” instead of asking what gender
differences exist between genders, focus should shift to answer what difference gender
makes. She argues that the construction of society into dual roles, such as male and
female, white and black, or even rational and irrational, are constructed in order to
exclude other identities. These “Others” are seen as being unfavorable in the dominant
conception of society, or even unimaginable (14). Similar to explanations given by queer
new institutionalism, certain gendered behaviors become policies as revealed in
McElhinny’s article. Language reflects beliefs, and these beliefs become actions that are
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reinforced. The dominant forces in society reinforce the positions of white males, and
they are associated by gender to be rational and objective. This is opposed to the
irrational and subjective which is associated with the feminine, as McElhinny notes. In
which case, the dichotomy between judicial restraint and activism, anything other than
the traditional vision of the ideal judge, becomes associated with the identity of those
officials that are female, black, LGBT, etc. It reinforces the excluded identities as Others
(McElhinny 2002, 114).
The author describes heteronormativity, which is what has come to be expected
from both genders. These values are analyzed to see how they impact LGBT persons, but
the author rejects constraints based on these values. Instead, she calls for an
understanding of sexuality that is stratified along a spectrum. The problem raised by
McElhinny that needs further understanding is that “sexuality is still rarely understood as
embedded in institutions and relations of inequality” (McElhinny 2002, 118-119).
Moving towards a stratified understanding of sexuality, as well as gender, would work
towards removing stereotypes regarding the roles of different individuals based on sex,
gender, race, and sexual orientation. As the article notes, most people do not work in
environments that are entirely welcoming and embracing of queer persons. For example,
it is noted that women that assume occupations traditionally associated with men are
often assumed to be lesbian. This label is still used as a pejorative term and is meant to
insult (McElhinny 2002, 121-122).
According to King (1991), men and women approach language in distinct ways,
and the dominant theories as to why this is are the “difference approach,” where men and
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women are believed to be from different subcultures, and the “dominance approach,”
where men are believed to reinforce their role in our patriarchal society. This is reflected
in conversations between men and women (King 1991, 2).
Sexism exists if men and women are treated differently, if the treatment is less
favorable to women, and if the basis for this treatment is attributed to gender. When it
comes to sexist language, that which is associated with maleness is deemed normal, or
there will be irrelevant reference to gender or physical appearance in domestic
relationships. Sexism persists in how women are addressed, or if they are addressed at all
–women are often ignored or objectified (King 1991, 3).
Historically, strong women have been ascribed adjectives that have decidedly
negative connotations that otherwise would not be used towards their male counterparts.
Studies have shown that sexualized language also reinforced the subordinate role of
women and embraces negative stereotypes. By one estimate, there are 220 sexualized
terms for women and only 22 for men. Researchers ascribe this to patriarchal dominance
in language, such as men being the ones who write the dictionary (King 1991, 22-23).
Sexism and racism exist because of more than just language, but using language
that reflects inequalities not only perpetuates existing differences in power, but reinforces
existing social structures (King 1991, 72). Conversely, according to King, removing
gender from all terms might suggest hypersensitivity (the book notes that a style guide in
Canada says it would be unusual to replace the term “man eating tiger” with “person
eating tiger”). The author instead argues for the usage of similar terminology regardless
of sex in order to suggest the lack of sexist attitudes (King 1991, 76-78).
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Queer theory and Queer New Institutionalism
In order to understand the constraints formed by the application of
heteropatriachal assumptions, one could start with Sedgwick’s Epistomology of the
Closet (1990) and Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990), seminal works in the establishment of
queer theory. The authors challenged the asymmetrical power balances that constituted
relationships and served as the basis for the order of institutions and society. Segdwick
argues that all of Western culture is based upon the structure of the hetero versus
homosexual axiom. She attributes the instability of these constructions to the inherent
paradox embedded within them. There is the minoritizing view, that homosexuals
comprise a small subset within a gender, and the universalizing view, that sexuality exists
on a spectrum and homosexuals operate as the transitive gender between male and
female. These two views are mutually exclusive and invariably lead to conflict
(Sedgwick 1990, 1-2).
Defining homosexuality gave the term an identity, offset by what is perceived to
be the more prevalent heterosexual. This created the power imbalance, where the
heterosexual is assumed to be natural, but then begins to rely on the homosexual for
definition. Without the homosexual, there is no heterosexual. The terms
heterosexual/homosexual then cease to be associated with sex acts and , instead, being to
comprise and entire identity defined by the terms (Sedgwick 1990, 10). According to
Sedgwick, what is not said has just as much significance as what is said. She argues that
which involves the closet can be especially revealing (Sedgwick 1990, 3). Her goal in
pursuing a queer theory was not to wade into the essentialist versus constructivist debate
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regarding homosexuality, but to open “the extent, construction, and meaning, and
especially the history of any such theoretical continuity – not to mention its consequences
for practical politics – must be open to every interrogation” (Sedgwick 1990,39). By
challenging the unspoken, assumed, and inherent, especially in how they relate to the
distribution of power, much can be revealed about how constraints of binarisms shape
reality.
In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler claims that individuals are formed and crafted
in accordance with political and social structures in society (Butler 1990, 3). She argues
that gender and sex should be distinct. These categories exists in what she calls a
“prediscursive domain” and when you remove them from their binary structures, such as
male versus female and masculine versus feminine, they become “free-floating” (Butler
1990, 9-13). Understanding gender and sex in this way is important because it allows one
to see femininity as defined as being the Other with masculinity being “synonymous with
the ‘universal’” (Butler 1990, 25).
Butler states that the binary relationship between the two established sexes is
regulated by grammar. It assures that nothing outside the dichotomous relationship can be
sustained. The problem, she establishes, is that this construction is doomed to failure.
Exceptions to the two established categories will inevitably arise. The construction of
these sexes, deemed to be natural, will unravel in the face of an Other that challenges
assumptions about the categorizations of gender and sex (Butler 1990, 26-46).
Understanding the instability and conflict in attempting to categorize
heterosexuality and homosexuality helps in approaching other dichotomous pairs.
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Binarisms identified by queer theory, such as male/female, white/black,
rational/irrational, reason/desire and even judicial restraint/judicial activism. The
minoritizing versus universalizing (or transitivity and separatism) paradox involving the
heterosexual/homosexual mirrors the conflict inherent in constitutional theory between
so-called judicial restraint/judicial activism.
Burgess (1999) argues that, in regards to constitutional theory, judicial restraint
holds the dominant position. She argues that even though there is no objective approach
as to how to interpret the constitution, judicial restraint has default legitimacy. Without
an objective position to conduct judicial review, unelected judges are given the power
and authority to invalidate what is enacted into law by democratically elected
representatives. Therefore restraint becomes the dominant perspective because it accepts
the preeminent role of “democratic authority.” This is in contrast to judicial activism,
although also subjective, is seen as being “anti-democratic.” It represents a judge’s
pursuit of their own political desires and the rejection of reason (Burgess 1999, 205).
Burgess employs what she calls a Queer New Institutionalism, in order to
challenge the assumptions regarding binarisms identified by queer theory. She links
judicial restraint/activism, as well as a host of other binarisms, to underlying sexuality
and desire that goes unquestioned in society. Burgess argues that it expressed by
sexualized language within the debate of constitutional theory. Although it goes without
notice, she cites several books containing terms frequently used and have a sexualized
connotation. For example, Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America: The Political
Seduction of the Law (1990) and Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and
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American Decline (1996), and Carl Cohen’s Naked Racial Preference: The Case Against
Affirmative Action (1995). She argues for a more critical analysis of the underlying sexual
assumptions that serve as the unquestioned basis for much of the discussion between
advocates of judicial restraint versus those favoring judicial activism in consideration of
the U.S. Constitution (Burgess 1999, 207-208).
A specific investigation by Burgess into Herbert Wechsler’s description of “naked
power organs” in “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) is employed
to further link judicial restraint/judicial activism to sexuality and desire. In it, Wechsler
appeals for a Supreme Court that “clothes” itself in “neutral principles” in being objective
in ruling on the law. This is in contrast to judicial activism, which represents the pursuit
of desired personal policy preferences. When justices allow the Court to be used in this
way, they are acting as a “naked power organ.” This instance of explicitly sexualized
language reveals his adherence to the confines of reinforced binarisms. An activist
Supreme Court is one that pursues its desires and passions in trying to craft the law. It
goes against reason. It is like a pervert who flashes his privates and has no shame, i.e. the
homosexual. In his call for neutrality and objectivity in consideration of constitutional
questions, Wechsler “outted” himself as being within the constraints of the dichotomous
relationships that define our system: heterosexuality as opposed to homosexuality, male
as opposed to female, and judicial restraint as opposed to judicial activism. His words
defined his reality, and as Burgess explains, this reality helped define him as an
individual (Burgess 1999, 210-213).
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New Institutionalist approaches call for an understanding of how actors operate
within and under the influence of institutions, as well as social and political factors.
Research approaching judges from the New Institutional view consider the social context
in which rulings are made, as well as the norms that courts must abide by so that their
rulings are seen as being legitimate. They must be aware of outside factors if they expect
their judicial opinions to have grounding, justification, to be accepted by the public at
large. Therefore, New Institutionalist approaches are able to transcend the barrier
between empirical analysis and the norms that constrain courts. They serve to describe
these influences as well as critique their impact (Gillman and Clayton 1999, 2-5).
With similarities between queer theory and New Institutionalism, Burgess (1999)
calls for using Queer New Institutionalism as a new approach in considering the
Constitution. She argues that since there is no consensus on how to interpret the
Constitution, problems will persist in consideration of constitutional theory. Calling for a
New Queer Institutionalist approach, she offers a critique of how society reinforces
“heterosexist constructions of sexuality” (Burgess 1999, 199-200). Burgess rejects the
focus given on the preferences of choices made by judges as explained by rational choice
theory. This shallow analysis fails to explain how judges come to decisions within the
context of the society and institutions within which they operate. Conversely, she charges
that New Institutionalism ignores heteronormative concepts that dominate our system of
governance (Burgess 1999, 203).
The role of the Senate Judiciary Committee
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According to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution states that the
president is to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and other officers of government with
the “advice and consent” of the Senate. The bulk of this work transpires in the Senate
Judiciary Committee, with the full Senate voting on to confirm the president’s
recommendations after they are referred from the committee (Schuck 1975, 224).
Congress decides on the number of courts and judges that exist and the number of
nominations submitted for review by the Senate varies per session. Reviewing these
nominations takes a significant portion of the committee’s time. The nominations of
Supreme Court justices, circuit court of appeals judges, and district court judges are
considered by the committee (Schuck 1975, 223). Investigations into Supreme Court
nominees are highly visible (O’Brien 2009, 106).
Gibson and Caldeira (2009) speculate that Americans form opinions about
Supreme Court nominees based on two possible considerations: if the individual
nominated has the qualifications and the experience to be a judge and if their ideology is
within the mainstream. They suggest that partisan ideology might come into play if nonpartisan experience and qualifications are not clear (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 140).
Debates regarding a nominees judicial qualifications, the following of stare decisis, or
arguments based on policy and political ideology are often complicated by charges of
“judicial activism” (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 143).
The authors then claim that in order for a Supreme Court nominee to be
successful, they must focus on their judicial qualifications instead of political themes, and
such was the case of Samuel Alito. Those that support a nominee will emphasize the
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judicial qualifications, while those opposed will focus on controversies derived from
political and policy related perspectives (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 140, 144). If
opposition to a nominee is to be successful, they have to focus on the political, policy,
and ideological issues necessary to derail confirmation, however Gibson and Caldeira
argue that this would be extremely difficult if there is even a modicum of support for the
argument that the nominee is judiciously qualified to serve on the Court given the
“reservoir of goodwill” that the Supreme Court maintains with the public (Gibson and
Caldeira 2009, 153).
Gibson and Caldeira believe that those that have preexisting institutional loyalty
to the Supreme Court are more likely to evaluate a nominee to the Supreme Court based
on their judicial qualifications compared to someone with less institutional loyalty, who
would then be more likely to judge the nominee based on political considerations (Gibson
and Caldeira 2009, 151). Their survey research found that frames are important in
helping citizens to evaluate nominees based on criteria involving judiciousness, which is
the necessary area of focus for the nominee and supports if they wish to secure
confirmation (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 153).
The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for nominees serve as a forum where
the discussion of judicial restraint versus activism persists. Judicial restraint is the
dominant theme persistent in many nomination hearings and is often associated with
originalists and strict constructionists. They acknowledge the persistence of this dialogue
in viewing the Constitution from a position of judicial restraint, whether they be
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originalists, strict constructionists, or textualists, are set in contrast to those that believe
the Constitution is a living document (O’Brien 2009, 200). According to Justice Scalia,
“It is only in recent years… that non-originalist exegesis has, so to speak, come
out of the closet, and put itself forward overtly as an intellectually legitimate
device… If constitutional interpretation could be adjusted as changing
circumstances required, a broad initial interpretation would have been
unnecessary.” (O’Brien 2009, 198-199)
Scalia discusses originalism and contrasts it with what he calls “nonoriginalism.”
He successfully frames the debate within terms of a dichotomous relationship.
Originalism is a developed and visible interpretation that is contrasted by Scalia to all
others. It thereby obscures other conceptions of the Constitution that might not fit within
the confines of the spheres labeled “originalism” and “nonoriginalism.” Instead of being
one among many ideas regarding the Constitution or perhaps one on a spectrum, it is
presented as being one of two options: the right way versus everything else. Thus
orignalists are able to own the concept of judicial restraint, while others can subsequently
be characterized as judicial activists (O’Brien 2009, 200).
Sager (2004) refutes originalism and challenges Americans to ask why
constitutional practices should be dictated by those long deceased and judges appointed
and removed from popular elections. He instead insists that the Constitution is underenforced. He uses provisions to provide for minimum welfare and to combat socially
entrenched biases as two prominent examples to support his position. He argues that it is
a good thing that they are under enforced by the Supreme Court, because they should be
enforced by policy developed from popularly elected officials (Sager 2004, 3-7).
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Sager makes an argument that the Constitution is least successful when it is the
most restrictive, such as in the Seventh Amendment where juries are permitted for civil
trials involving amounts over twenty dollars. Sager wants to know why some ideas, such
as equal protection, are so broadly outlined by the Constitution, when the framers were
evidently capable of being specific and particular in addressing certain aspects, such as in
the Seventh Amendment (Sager 2004, 51-52).
Sager states that the framers did not have the opportunity that we have today: the
ability to draw upon the experiences of generations of people living under the
Constitution and observe its practical impact. The Constitution was crafted, debated, and
ratified, but this was for the text guaranteeing, for example, equal protection, and not how
that specific text would apply to a specific situation 100 years in the future (Sager 2004,
55-56). Sager categorizes constitutional practices into three categories: There is agency,
which includes orignalism and reluctant judgment; partnership, including justice seeking
approaches and democratarians; and guardianship approaches, which the author notes is
not a viable approach thus far in American constitutionalism (Sager 2004, 16).
To reinforce his position, Sager details how high profile originalists, such as
Justice Scalia and failed Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, stray from their
constitutional philosophies. This is in spite of the perpetuating argument that underlies
Supreme Court nomination hearings: the debate between judicial restraint and judicial
activism, between originalists and those that believe in a Living Constitution (Sager
2004, 58-59; O’Brien 2009, 207).
Left with only two viable approaches to the constitution, Sager admits that,

17
“The reader may feel that I am forcing constitutional theory, and hence
constitutional theorists, against an artificially sharp dichotomy between the
agency model with its instruction-taking ideal and the partnership model with its
collaborative ideal. It may appear that I have somehow lumbered reluctant
judgment theory with conceptual entailments that it need not accept. But the point
is this: Either we value the independent judgment of judges as collaborators in the
constitutional project of identifying the fundamental demands of political justice
or we do not.” (Sager 2004, 68-69)
Even as a critic of originalism and despite his ability to set forth a number of approaches
to constitutional theory in the United States, Sager is able to construe his argument within
the confines of a binarism. Although he notes that this construction into two spheres is
“artificial,” it is beside the point and he goes on to highlight what he finds more
instructive to those approaching the debate. However, when one confronts the
conversations forwarded in nomination hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
one finds that these dichotomous approaches to constitutional theory are utilized,
artificial or not.
A review of these interpretations regarding the Constitution shows that binarisms
are effective in framing the debate. Reducing the debate to a choice between judicial
restraint/judicial activism pushes out alternative conceptions, such as those identified by
Sager. It allows justices, like Scalia, to cast his position within the mainstream of
“restraint” and everything else that differs as “activist.” It demonstrates the effectiveness
of these perpetuating normative constraints.
The Senate Judiciary Committee and Supreme Court nomination hearings are not
strangers to controversies surrounded gender, race, and sexuality. In 1991, Professor
Anita Hill alleged that the nominee, Judge Clarence Thomas, has sexually harassed her
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several years before. Professor Hill alleged that while she had worked as Judge Thomas’
subordinate in the 1980s at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he had
sexually harassed her. These allegations, tantamount to a he-said she-said debate, were
revealed just days before the committee was expected to vote on Thomas’ confirmation
when a staffer leaked the allegations to the media (Ragan et al. 1996, xv-xvi, 133).
During the Hill-Thomas controversy, it may not have been the intent of the
senators to treat Hill unfairly or unjustly, but the dynamic and power relationships
revealed in language studies of the hearings prove otherwise (Ragan et al. 1996, xx). The
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee are not impartial judges, but rather elected
officials that serve six year terms. They are held accountable by the electorate. As a
member of the committee, they may take on the role of an impartial judge, a juror
deciding which testimony to believe, or a political actor pushing a certain agenda. Which
of these roles they assume, explicitly or implicitly, is the decision of the individual
senator (Ragan et al. 1996, 6-7).
Thomas, in now famous words, referred to his nomination hearing as a “high-tech
lynching” and used the metaphor to illustrate the proceedings as being organized along
racial lines, as opposed to Hill who did not evoke a similar metaphor while
simultaneously defying stereotypes by being an educated, single, professional black
female (Ragan et al. 1996, 53). Nevertheless, these words were a powerful from a black
man facing a black female accuser before a panel of all white, male senators (Ragan et al.
1996, 39). As Hill herself stated, “because I and my reality did not comport with what
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they accepted as their reality, I and my reality had to be reconstructed by the Senate
committee members with assistance from the press and others” (Ragan et al. 1996, 49).
Ragan et al. (1996) utilize a number of diverse studies in order to examine the
Hill-Thomas controversy in ways that were not necessarily within the realm of public
perception when the hearings actually took place. Notably among them, one chapter
focuses on how individual senators were able to use their roles as questioners on the
committee to reconstruct Clarence Thomas’ image for the public. Before the accusations
broke, Thomas’ team focused on selling his trustworthiness to the committee and tried to
avoid emphasis on controversial issues. For example, he evaded questions concerning
abortion. However, the authors argued that this led to suspicion regarding his
trustworthiness (Ragan et al. 1996, 91). The sexualized language attributed to Thomas
did not have to be proved or disproven, because of the political setting, his supports only
had to deflect attention away from controversy and mold him within the confines of what
was expected from a potential Supreme Court justice to mainstream Americans.
From an intercultural examination of the Hill-Thomas hearings, one analysis from
Ragan et al. (1996) attempts to show how outgroups versus ingroups set the stage for how
the public viewed and interpreted the hearings. Hill was a woman and black standing
before the senators who were all male and white (Ragan et al. 1996, 58). The idea of self
is something that is socially constructed but evolved and constantly being refined. Most
conceptions of the self revolve around dichotomous parings, such as public versus
private, but also “while defying definition” (Ragan et al. 1996, 63). The Hill-Thomas
hearings served as an example in the past where the Senate Judiciary Committee served
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as an arena where identity was crafted, but the accused and the accuser, in order to win
public support.
After Anita Hill was forced to come forward with her claims of sexual
harassment, it was the job of Republican senators to advocate on behalf of Thomas in
order to repair his image to the public and save his nomination. Senator Specter
reconstructed Hill’s narrative by repeating what she said and highlighting alleged
inconsistencies. In his closing remarks he ignored her answers and reiterated her claims
(Ragan et al. 1996, 50-51). Although the hearings were formatted in much the same way
as a trial, they were not. Thomas was able to defend himself more effectively by speaking
to the committee before his accuser addressed it. Senator Specter accused Hill of the
crime of perjury through his line of questions directed at Thomas and inflecting his
opinion to shift the criticism onto her (Ragan et al. 1996, 180-181). By defining Hill as
the Other, a woman who defied heteronormative conceptions and was associated with
activism, Thomas became associated with the dominant spheres: male, heterosexual,
private, restrained, modest, etc.
Republican senators utilized aggressive lines of questioning that were laced with
subtle and overt challenges to the validity of Hill’s testimony. Ragan et al. found in an
ethnomethodological analysis of the hearings that accusations and insults were
incorporated into the Republican senator’s statements during the hearings in order to
achieve these goals (Ragan et al. 1996, 32). Another study on impression management
presented in the book found that senators tried to repair Thomas’ reputation by utilizing
nonverbal communication. Emotions were intertwined in their statements in committee as
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opposed to a focus on rational and logical arguments to refute Hill’s allegations. For
example, the authors note that Senator Hatch used the raising of his voice at the end of
lines of questioning to signal that he expected a “no” response to his inquiry (Ragan et al.
1996, 101-104).
There were also studies on verbal and non-verbal deception, as well as
believability, and audience evaluations of selected portions of the hearings. These studies
all are effective in raising a number of questions regarding the believability of Thomas,
the fairness of the hearings to handle the allegations brought forward by Hill, and how
issues of identity and power may have been more important and were otherwise
overlooked by the public during the televised committee proceedings. The hearings
showed that narratives were constructed for Judge Thomas by senators advocating on his
behalf. This is in contrast to Hill, who forwarded her narrative by herself without an
advocate on the Senate Judiciary Committee (Ragan 1996, 155-157).
Many of the senators that sat on the committee for the Hill-Thomas hearings
remain in the Senate and were involved in the nominations of judges in the 110th and
111th Congresses. Senator Specter was involved in the Hill-Thomas hearings and is
known for furthering the narrative that Anita Hill was a “scorned woman” and suggested
in his questioning that she made up the sexual harassment story in order to seek revenge
for Clarence Thomas refusing her romantic advances (Ragan et al. 1996, 153). While
subsequent nominations, such as those of future justices Alito, Roberts, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, did not involve allegations of sexual harassment, the presence of the same sitting
senators gives cues as to where to expect language reinforcing heteronormative ideals. If
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Hatch was capable of using leading lines of questioning and raise his voice to get the
responses he wanted, he could do it again during more recent nomination hearings. If
Specter was able to formulate alternative motivations regarding individuals, he could do
it again.
Although Ragan et al. (1996) indicate a bias towards believing the testimony of
Anita Hill, the study raises significant points about how power dynamics came into play
in the hearings. A panel of all male, white senators served as political jurists in a debate
where the interplay between sex, gender, race, and status all intersected. Despite
illuminating the existence of power dynamics in the committee setting, the case study is
limited due to the fact that is has been two decades since the events transpired.
Discourse analysis
Although modern research is predisposed to accepting the dominance of the
white, male, middle class perspective, approaches dealing with power, language, and
gender have an overlap with social constructionism: according to Alvesson and
Sköldberg, they “avoid objectivistic assumptions and claims.” By utilizing discourse
analysis, language can be examined to determine how reality is constructed and uncover
the underlying assumptions at the core of society and social institutions. Reality is
reproduced through the maintenance of norms within institutions. These norms are
reinforced through the use of language. It enables the status quo and order to be
maintained, and power is expressed through this construction (Alvesson and Sköldberg
2009, 228-229).
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Constructivist conceptions of discourse analysis attempt to understand how
society perpetuates conceptions of power. A critical discursive analysis, applied in this
study, seeks to understand the power dynamics that are perpetuated and their impact and
consequences (Irving and English 2008, 108). There is not one distinct approach to
discourse analysis, but several. There is no “right” answer in examining discourse, as
there are multiple perspectives. However, the goal is to delve into the material in order to
better understand the relational meaning that evolves throughout discourse (Gee 1999, 45). Language is not neutral, and investigation will reveal the presence of ideologies.
While the subjectivity of such approaches may seem “unprincipled and inconsequential,”
the ability to understand more perspectives furthers debates (Widdowson 1998, 149).
Uncovering power dynamics through discourse analysis means that, once seen, they
cannot be unseen. And while Sedgwick argues that deconstructive analyses may not be
enough to undo the constraints of binarisms, Burgess’ argument that the practical effects
lead to unworkable application of such theoretical constraints gives one hope (Sedgwick
1990, 10; Burgess 1999, 214).
Discrepancies based on gender perpetuate sexism. Dominance, perspectives, and
attitudes typically associated with men are favored and reproduced, leaving the
experiences of women to be disregarded. A critical feminist approach to nomination
hearings will allow a critique of existing conceptions and structures in which
discrimination based on gender, or “gender blindness,” is exacerbated (Alvesson and
Sköldberg 2009, 237). If societally established gender differences and constraints are
based on discrimination inherent in the system, then they should be challenged and
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questioned in light of more diverse nominees to the Supreme Court. The system was
established by wealthy, white, men and was crafted with language that did not grant equal
status to a majority of its citizens. Although the Constitution has evolved over time,
inherent bias based on the perspectives of those who crafted the system can still be
perpetuated.
Discourse analysis follows post-structuralism, in that both approaches assume
people to be inconsistent. There is a difference between language and external reality.
The difference between the two is that discourse analysis is empirical and systematic as a
research endeavor. All language is fair game: texts, speeches, documents, etc. It is also
qualitative to solve the problem of emphasis on consistency and the occlusion of
discrepancies. Qualitative research must avoid acknowledging multiple meanings and
instead prefer a primary meaning. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) state that discourse
analysis asks: “On what occasions are the different attitudes expressed? How are the
utterances constructed? In what contexts are they included and what functions do they
fulfill?” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 229-232).
The benefit of dealing with documents and texts, as opposed to interviews with
subjects, is that there is no researcher influence upon that which is being studied. It is also
useful because comparing the accounts given from the perspectives of different
individuals allows the researcher to uncover the constructive meaning revealed by the
conflicting views and statements (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 162). Reviewing a limited
set of circumstances will help elaborate upon the experiences of individuals, such as
women, which will limit over-generalizations (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 240). As
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society changes over time, we should not expect previous women nominated to the court,
such as O’Connor and Ginsburg, to have the same experience as Sotomayor and Kagan
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 103). By reviewing the most recent Supreme Court
nomination hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the limits of confining
debates of constitutional theory between categorizations between judicial restraint and
judicial activism will hopefully be revealed in the face of more diverse nominees that do
not fall within the construction of prevailing heterosexist norms.
Reviewing a forum as highly salient to the public as Supreme Court nomination
hearings will allow for the revelation of inconsistencies in the treatment of different
nominees. The rigidity of previously identified dichotomous pairings in the face of
increasingly diverse nominees will, if Queer New Institutionalism is correct, lead to the
failure of the confining categorizations to adequate explain the judicial philosophies of
the individuals that appear before the committee.
As queer theory identifies the dichotomous relationships between heterosexual
and homosexual spheres as well as others, such as white/black, male/female, Burgess
focuses on what she calls the “central binarism of constitutional theory,” the ongoing
debate over judicial restraint and judicial activism (Burgess 1999, 204). Echoing the
sentiments of Sager (2004), she challenges Americans to ask why constitutional
interpretation is decided by unelected individuals far removed from the democratic
process (Sager 2004, 3). Burgess goes one step further than Sager, and argues that judges
interpret the Constitution without an objective standard. Lacking a consensus among the
electorate in order to make rulings, she believes that it is not possible for judges to argue
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that they make decisions objectively and absent from political influences (Burgess 1999,
205-206).
Burgess calls for judges that make decisions utilizing common conceptions of
gender, race, and class. Often absent from these interpretations are critical analyses of the
biased system favoring patriarchal dominance and heterosexist understandings. By
highlighting examples in which scholars argue for a restrained interpretation of the
constitution fashioned from an objective and neutral position while simultaneously
utilizing sexualized language, Burgess convinces the reader to consider the implications
of unchallenged assumptions about heteropreference and engendered patriarchal
dominance (Burgess 1999; 206-208).
The Senate Judiciary Committee holds hearings for judicial nominees selected by
the president where debates regarding constitutional theory are ongoing. Nominees are
questioned to identify their views and assess if they are within the mainstream of the
American populace. The problem, as confirmed by authorities on either side of the
debate, is that interpretations of the Constitution are constructed as being discrete and
oppositional. Queer New Institutionalism calls attention to the effects of this
construction: perpetuation of the status quo, in which heteronormative and sexist
preferences that are built within our system of governance are reinforced and perpetuated.
Each section will focus on the individual nominees before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Chapter 2 focuses on the nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito
during the 109th Congress. Chapter 3 focuses on the nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan during the 111th Congress. The four hearings will be examined for the use
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of words spoken by senators and witnesses before the committee to reinforce
heteronormative expectations and behavior. Then, metaphors will be identified as well, in
search of support for the theory of Queer New Institutionalism. Finally, the important
binary pairs emphasized during each nominee’s confirmation hearing will be examined.
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2. Methods and Judicial Nominations during the 109th United States Congress
Following the theory of Queer New Institutionalism, there is no objective
approach regarding how to interpret the United States Constitution. By highlighting
dichotomous pairings, Burgess (1999) argues that sexualized language is used to
reinforce institutionalized norms that perpetuate asymmetrical power structures. For
example, majority spheres of influence are associated with that which is male, white,
heterosexual, rational, and judicial restraint. But these dominant groups depend upon the
existence of their counterparts, the Other, minority spheres comprised of female,
black/non-white, homosexual, irrational/empathetic, and judicial activism (Burgess 1999,
204-205).
Again, this study will answer the following research questions:
What are the underlying sexual themes that permeate nomination hearings for judges and
justices before the Senate Judiciary Committee?
How are the heterosexist norms that are present in discussions regarding constitutional
theory reinforced through nomination hearings?
What is the effect of the persistence of institutionalized heterosexist norms?
Following a social constructivist approach that incorporates perspectives derived from
feminist and queer theories, among others, a form of discourse analysis was employed to
review how senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee engage and vet nominees to the
United States Supreme Court. Transcripts provided by the Senate Judiciary Committee on
its website were reviewed, along with pre-recorded webcasts of Supreme Court
nomination hearings provided on the committee’s and C-SPAN’s websites, in order to
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identify the main issue areas highlighted by the senators as well as specific instances of
metaphors and explicit language directed towards the nominees in order to reinforce
institutionalized heterosexist norms.
The study relies on the assumptions already presented by the theory of Queer
New Institutionalism: that unequal spheres of influence exist and that heterosexist norms
have been institutionalized within power structures, namely the male, white,
heterosexual, rational, and judicial restraint perspective dominates at the expense of
subverting that which is associated with the female, black/non-white, homosexual,
empathetic, and judicial activism. The dominant spheres therefore cause the perpetuation
of similar perspectives and reproduce the existing power structures. Burgess identified
instances of sexualized language used by legal scholars to reinforce these dichotomous
pairings. Following a social constructivist perspective, it is assumed that language
continues to reproduce the existence of these power structures in reality (Alvesson and
Sköldberg 2009, 28).
With the theory of Queer New Institutionalism set as the basis for the study,
individual cases can be examined in order to determine how they fit within the confines
of the theory. Using this process of abduction, the theory can be further developed with
the goal of being able to apply it to more cases than those previously identified. In
contrast to induction and deduction, further testing of Queer New Institutionalism with
empirical data will allow the theory to be modified and refined, thus expanding
understanding (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 4).
Setting
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The setting for the study is the Senate Judiciary Committee nomination hearings
for the U.S. Supreme Court during the 109th and 111th Congresses, for the four most
recently appointed Supreme Court justices. As a standing committee, it is charged with
fulfilling the Senate’s duty in approving judicial nominations by the president. These
hearings take place before the committee in the Hart Senate Office Building. Tradition
allows the nominee to come before the committee in order to give testimony and answer
questions from the members (Senate Judiciary Committee website 2011).
Sample and Participants
The Senate Judiciary Committee provides detailed records on its website for
nominees to the courts. Available for the public to access are documents, written
responses from nominees to questions from senators, background information, prior
works provided by the nominees, as well as audio and visual records, including those of
the nomination hearings themselves. Given the importance of Supreme Court
nominations, the 18 Democrats and Republicans that comprise the committee are present
to ask the potential justices questions. Only 17 Chief Justices and 112 associate justices
have ever been selected to be on the Supreme Court (Senate Judiciary Committee website
2011).
The difference in the political arena during the two Congresses allows for a type
of natural experiment to be conducted. The nominees selected during the 109th Congress,
John Roberts and Samuel Alito, were made by a Republican president, George W. Bush,
and testified before the Senate while it was controlled by Republicans. During the 111th
Congress, nominees Sotomayor and Kagan, were selected by a Democratic president,
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Barack Obama, and testified before the Senate while controlled by Democrats. While
there were changes in those that sat on the committee, many of the senators remain the
same across all four nomination hearings. The primary difference is then that 109th
Congress was presented with nominees selected by a Republican, the 111th by a
Democrat. Also important, with the context of the theory of Queer New Institutionalism,
is that the nominees made by President Bush, Roberts and Alito, were both white men,
whereas those made by President Obama were female, Sotomayor, a Hispanic woman,
and Kagan, a white woman (Senate Judiciary Committee website 2011).
Measurements
The framework outlined by Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of
Reality (1966) serves as the basis for the deconstruction prescribed by Queer New
Instititonalism. There is power in language, and words serve as basic units to be built into
metaphors. These metaphors in turn are used to construct reality. Reality is then
reproduced through generations in order to construct subsequent individuals (Berger and
Luckmann 1966, 64-67; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, 28). Burgess’ argument for a
Queer New Institutionalism relied on revealing the underlying heterosexist bias of the
institutions in society. She was able to highlight these by looking for accepted ideas
related to the law which utilized sexualized language. In her review of Wechsler’s
“Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” she noted his use of the phrase
“naked power organ” to describe the U.S. Supreme Court. Another example she mentions
is the colloquialism “he got Borked,” with its sexual connotation, established after the
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nomination of Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court failed to pass a vote in the Senate
(Burgess 1999, 207-209).
These examples fit within the framework initially noted by Berger and Luckmann
(1966) and serve as the basis for Burgess’ research. They remain a starting point in
attempting to deconstruct the assumptions accepted as default and natural when
considering aspects of the law, such as nominations before the Senate Judiciary
Committee examined in this study. Taking the asymmetrically dichotomous pairings
illustrated by Burgess, such as male versus female, white versus black, heterosexual
versus homosexual, reason versus desire, judicial restraint versus judicial activism, etc,
words, metaphors, and issue areas were sought that would fit within the construction of
these binarisms. In Burgess’ example of Weschler’s text, the phrase “naked power organ”
referencing the United States Supreme Court was effective in contrasting the majority
spheres, the male, heterosexual, and reason, with the minority Others, such as female,
homosexual, and desire. After this distinction is elucidated, Weschler then called for the
application of “neutral principles” thereby “clothing” a Supreme Court which would
otherwise be a “naked power organ.” By making this charge, Weschler completes the
linkage ascribed by Queer New Institionalism: judicial restraint belongs in the majority
spheres of the pairings. Judicial restraint represents the male, white, heterosexual,
reasoned perspective. This relegates judicial activism to the female, black (or non-white),
homosexual perspective, driven by desire (Burgess 1999, 208-210).
First, this study will attempt to identify the single words that serve to reinforce the
dichotomous pairings previously outlined. Those that have sexual connotations or double
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entendres serve to contrast binarisms as discussed. Second, phrases and metaphors are
also located to distinguish between the spheres presented. If Berger and Luckmann’s
(1966) theory regarding the legitimization of knowledge hold true, such instances
function in constructing reality and subsequently reproducing it (Alvesson and Sköldberg
2009, 28).
The nominations during the 111th Congress, the most recently completed
Congress, saw the nomination and confirmation of two more women to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Given the previously outlined dichotomous pairings, Sotomayor and Kagan
display several characteristics that represent the Other and maintain minority positions
that threaten the pre-established and accepted social and institutional order. Alito and
Roberts, nominated during the 109th Congress, were conservative, white men. They were
both married, heterosexual (presumably), and had children. Both had served previously as
federal judges (U.S. Senate 2005; U.S. Senate 2006). Sotomayor and Kagan, by
comparison, were selected by a Democratic president and presumed to be liberal, both
were single, career women without children. They mark the third and fourth women ever
appointed to the Supreme Court. Sotomayor also had the distinction of being the first
Hispanic nominee to the Court. Sotomayor had previously served as a federal judge.
Kagan did not have experience as a judge, but served as dean of Harvard Law School and
U.S. Solicitor General (U.S. Senate 2009; Marcus 2010).
Third, issue areas will be identified that reinforce the differences apparent in the
nominees from what is required following the traditional and accepted majority: white,
heterosexual males that adhere to judicial restraint in their approach to constitutional
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theory (Burgess 1999, 203-204). These issue areas represent the main topics that Senators
reference in their lines of questioning. Many are repeated and utilized in order to damage
or derail the nominee’s credibility, reputation, and ability to interpret the law and
Constitution within the mainstream of American public opinion (Gibson and Caldeira
2009, 140).
As working women, if Queer New Institutionalism is correct, nominees
Sotomayor and Kagan represent a threat to the preconceived notions of what a justice to
the Supreme Court should look like. These are two individuals who focused on their
careers and succeeded. They are unmarried and have no children. Sotomayor is the first
Hispanic woman to be nominated to the Supreme Court. By remaining unmarried, both
women challenge the assumption that the heteropatriachal family is the basic unit
required by society in order for success (Burgess 1999, 201). Therefore, we would expect
that words and metaphors used during the hearings will emphasize the Otherness of these
nominees and subsequently, the issue areas considered by the Senators that subscribe to
these biases favoring traditional constructions of society and institutions will relate to
them as well (Burgess 1999, 205).
Applying discourse analysis
Following discourse analysis as outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987), ten steps
are taken towards a better understanding of the conversations approached: identifying
research questions, selecting a sample, collecting records and documents, interviews,
transcription, coding, analysis, validation, reporting, and application (Potter and
Wetherell 1987, 160-174). Although interviewing is a key part of the process for the
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authors, Gee (1999) states there is more than one way to approach discourse analysis, and
the main task it to understand language in use (4-5). This allows for interviewers to be
less rigid in conducting research with subjects. Instead of a formal survey which might
rely significantly on yes/no or other structured responses, the authors argue that a less
formal approach allows for responses which are more useful to the researcher in
understanding the construction and function of discourse. What is important about this
portion of their research design, as it is absent from a discourse analysis of Supreme
Court nomination hearings, is that the researcher is forced to adapt due to the less rigid
interaction. The researcher reacts and can respond to the interviewee’s responses with
new questions. Thus, the researcher’s responses must be recorded and analyzed and not
just the respondent’s. (Potter and Wetherell 1987 164-165).
In a study that does not have interviewers, but still approaches language and the
construction and function it serves within discourse, the researcher must also not be
excluded from the analysis. The use of abduction in research allows for a single case to
be investigated while interpreting it using an overarching pattern previously established
by theory, Queer New Instititoinalism in this instance, which then explains the case in
question. Although it shares similarities with both induction and deduction, it is not the
same or simply a mix of the two. It adds new features: the investigation from the
perspective of the theory leads to new insights and then allow for adjustment and
refinement of the overarching theory going forward. Also, it incorporates understanding,
allowing for reflexive research that incorporates and acknowledges the researcher
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conducting the study and their relationship with the subjects engaged (Alvesson and
Sköldberg 2009, 4).
Unlike content analysis, discourse analysis allows for deeper understanding in
analyzing language. Instead of simply counting instances in which certain words or
phrases arise during the conversation, discourse analysis seeks to categorize the content
into relevant areas (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 167). From this point, the documents are
read in order to establish patterns and thereby determine the function and consequences
of the language (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 168).
The primary sources of data were transcripts and video from the proceedings.
Pursuant to Burgess’ theory, instances of sexualized and gendered language that revealed
the reinforcement of binarisms were identified (Burgess 1999, 207, 213). Specifically, the
nomination hearings of the four justices were reviewed for sexual language that does
serve the purpose of reinforcing constraints and then it was searched to identify similar
language across the nomination hearings. This allows for further identification of power
imbalance, as certain gendered/sexualized language may be attributed to one type of
nominee over others (for example, directed towards women and not men).
After identifying the presence of this language, it was examined within the
context of the discourse to see how/if it reinforced common binarisms as identified by
Burgess and Sedgwick (heterosexual/homosexual, male/female, white/black,
reason/desire, judicial restraint/judicial activism, democratic authority/individual rights,
etc. (Burgess 1999, 200, 217). Following Queer New Institutionalism, it is in these
instances where incoherence of theoretical constraints based on dichotomous pairings
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will reveal themselves as they are applied practically (Burgess 1999, 214). And according
to Sedgwick, after this occurs and the presence of a minoritized Other is absent, those
that previously reinforced the binarisms will being to transit the boundaries between the
pairs (Sedgwick 1990, 124-125).
The Nomination of John Roberts to the United States Supreme Court
In the summer of 2005, after the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
President Bush nominated John Roberts, a U.S. Appellate Court judge, to replace him.
Originally nominated to replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the passing of the
chief justice prompted the president to elevate Roberts to the head role on the Supreme
Court. It was the first Supreme Court nomination hearing in 11 years and only the 17th
chief justice nomination in U.S. history (U.S. Senate 2005, 2, 4, 6, 7, 21).
Judge Roberts was nominated when the Senate, and thus the Judiciary Committee,
was controlled by Republicans. The Senate Judiciary committee was comprised of
Democratic members Patrick Leahy (who was later the chairman of the committee during
the 111th Congress), Edward Kennedy, Joe Biden, Herbert Kohl, Dianne Feinstein, Russ
Feingold, Charles Schumer, and Dick Durbin. The Republican majority on the committee
was comprised of members Orrin Hatch, Charles Grassley, Jon Kyl, Mike DeWine, Jeff
Sessions, Lindsey Graham, John Cornyn, Sam Brownback, Tom Coburn, with Arlen
Specter as the chair of the committee (he later switched parties and was a Democrat
during the 111th Congress) (U.S. Senate 2005, ii; U.S. Senate 2009, ii).
The nomination hearings before the committee took place on Capitol Hill on
September 12th through the 15th, 2005 (Roberts 2005, iii). The setting for the nomination
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hearings was during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, which devastated New Orleans.
Being the first nomination hearing in over a decade, a significant portion of time was
spent by the senators probing Judge Roberts on the bounds of what he was willing to
answer in his testimony. Reference was made at several points during the proceedings to
the “Ginsburg Precedent,” her view that a nominee should give “no hints, no forecasts, no
previews” during the committee hearings as to how they would rule on a case before the
Court (Roberts 2005, 377). Although Roberts followed this rule, he was chastised by
senators for not being more revealing. This was especially true for Senator Schumer, who
charged that Roberts would “cite it when you don’t want to answer something” (Roberts
2005, 260). This reveals the committees, as well as the nominee’s, challenge: to use the
hearings to uncover as much as possible, but not so much that the future justice has
prejudged all the cases that are to come before the Court or passed a litmus test.
At the beginning of the hearings, several Republican senators made reference to
the Supreme Court being a “super-legislature” and justices acting as “super legislator[s]”
citing the prevalence of 5-4 decisions from the Court as evidence that the body had
become politicized. Chairman Specter told the committee that appointing a new Chief
Justice would provide opportunity to “rebuild the image of the Court.” The repeated use
of the same term, super-legislature, signifies a coordinated partisan effort in approaching
the committee hearings, at least at the outset. Senators Specter, Grassley, Brownback, and
Cornyn used their opening statements to frame the debate within the confines of the
established binarisms of judicial restraint and activism: the Court has become politicized
and was thus controlled by activists. It should not be a “super-legislature” and instead
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must be returned to the status of a neutral arbiter, and by acting in concert, Judge
Roberts’ supporters can make it their duty to do so (Roberts 2005, 2, 13, 41, 46).
Specter also made use of the terms “super-stare decisis” and “super precedents”
to reinforce an ideological position he holds: that Roe v. Wade and a woman’s right to
choose had been reinforced by the Court so many times, that it cannot and should not be
overturned. After 38 cases which solidified the holding of Roe v. Wade, he wanted Justice
Roberts to assure him that he would not be a vote against abortion rights (Roberts 2005,
144-147). This is an example of language used to reinforce an ideological position which
did not fall along party lines. Democrats questioned Roberts about abortion rights as well,
but did not use the same terms as Specter. Republican Senator Hatch said “I am not sure a
super-duper precedent exists” (Roberts 2005, 159). And Senator Brownback cites Plessy
v. Ferguson as proof that super-stare decisis does not exist. Despite the Court reaffirming
“separate but equal” in numerous cases, it was overturned (Roberts 2005, 289). This
discussion among the Republican senators shows that some issues cross partisan lines,
and while they might debate each other cordially, there is significant disagreement over
the role of a justice in deciding on such matters.
Questioning identity
Like the Supreme Court nominations during the 111th Congress, those during the
109th Congress did not occur in a vacuum. The media reported on the President’s
selection of Judge Roberts to be the new Chief Justice prior to the nomination hearings.
And, like Kagan, questions arose regarding Robert’s sexuality. On August21, 2005, the
New York Times published an article comparing Robert’s association with a nascent
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conservative movement on campus at Harvard with the marginalized status of
homosexuals. It ran with a picture of Roberts and two male friends (Scott 2005).
The article reinforced the point made by Sedgwick (1990), that homosexuality
ceases to be merely a description of a sexual act between two persons of the same gender,
and instead comes to refer to an identity, where the association of two persons based on
factors other than sexual acts is come to be known as homosexual (45-47). It is implied
by the article, possibly meant to fuel speculation in much the same way as the Wall Street
Journal did by publishing the picture of Kagan playing softball, that Roberts is a
homosexual, and a closeted one at that. As if three men pictured with a pie they made in
the 80s and a quote comparing conservatives with queers has the ability to rewrite history
in order to label some homosexual (Appendix A). Unlike the photo of Kagan, it did not
appear to gain traction because Roberts eventually confirmed to heteropreferential norms:
he is married man and has children. Questions of sexuality were central during Kagan’s
nomination hearing, with repeated references to controversy surrounding Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell and the Solomon Amendment. While questions regarding same-sex marriage
arose during Roberts’ nomination hearing, they were not central (U.S. Senate 2005, 148149).
Using words to reinforce binarisms
In a particularly telling exchange between Senator Cornyn and Roberts, the
Senator describes the United States under the Articles of Confederation. He says that the
federal government was “impotent” under such a document, and it led to the drafting of
the current Constitution at convention. This was immediately after a discussion between
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the two over neutral principles and the need to follow stare decisis (U.S. Senate 2005,
270-271).
Cornyn uses sexualized language to frame the debate, defining the U.S.
Constitution in a mutually dependent relationship with the Articles of Confederation. The
binarism therefore invokes a reference to the penis: the federal government was incapable
and ineffective under the “impotent” authority of the Articles of Confederation (U.S.
Senate 2005, 271). The Articles had no enforcement power over the states, and by
utilizing a sexualized term, Cornyn is able to associate the Articles with the feminine,
homosexual, and non-white while reserving the Constitution with the masculine,
heterosexual, and white. The federal government desired control over the states, but was
emasculated and impotent under the Articles, unable to be effective and enforce power.
The U.S. Constitution, replacing the articles, is strong and is master over the states.
Having stamina and endurance, it has endured through time. And it is potent, adjudicating
over effective, productive government (Burgess 1999, 204).
However, once again the inconsistency of the dichotomous pairing emphasized by
the sexualized language is revealed when applied in practice. The Articles of
Confederation were impotent, but to replace them a constitutional convention was held. It
was an instance of activism: the drafting of a new governing document to replace the
Articles. It was not through the reason afforded by the Articles that a more virile
governing document evolved. It was through the desire to subject the states to the
dominance of a stronger federal government and working outside the bounds of selfimposed constraint that allowed for their replacement. Ironically, praise is given for the
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endurance of the U.S. Constitution, but it was forged through a process which is abhorred
by the most ardent of its supporters on the committee, such as Cornyn. By labeling the
Articles of Confederation as impotent, he outs his desire for the Constitution, and his
association with the homosexual by focusing on phallic terminology.
Judicial restraint/judicial activism
The Republican committee members repeatedly and emphatically state that the
Court should be an objective body, free from politicization. Multiple senators reinforce
the dominant sphere of the judicial restraint/judicial activism binarism. Specter wants a
Court of “consensus” (Roberts 2005, 2). Grassley praises Roberts as a replacement for
Rehnquist, who exercised “judicial restraint” (Roberts 2005, 13). Kyl says that the
Supreme Court is not a “political office,” thereby reinforcing the idea that the Supreme
Court should follow neutral principles (Roberts 2005, 19). Sessions warns that activism is
a judge ruling based on the desired outcome, to see policy preferences enacted (Roberts
2005, 30). Brownback tells Roberts that the Founding Fathers wrote about restraint, and
uses a baseball metaphor to reinforce his position: a judge is like an umpire and therefore
cannot play on the field; a judge cannot rule in favor of their policy preferences. To do
so, would further tear our country apart. He gets emotional as he notes the political
division that plagues American society (Roberts 2005, 46-47). Over and over, at different
times and citing different examples, the Republican committee members appealed for a
justice who will adhere to the confines of judicial restraint.
Returning to the idea of super-precedence, Brownback attacked the idea of
repeated reinforcements of the holdings of a case as being irreversible. Roe v. Wade may
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have been reinforced in 38 subsequent cases, but that does not necessarily make it the
correct decision. Brownback cites the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case, which
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and found separate but equal to be unconstitutional as a
seminal event in which the Court overturned existing precedent. He goes on to note “the
Supreme Court has overruled itself in 174 cases” involving constitutional issues (Roberts
2005, 47).
After characterizing Roberts as a justice who will adhere to judicial restraint, and
after Republican senators repeatedly and thoroughly praised and called for a replacement
justice that would adhere to neutral principles, be an objective arbiter, and exercise
restraint, Brownback in the absence of an Other representing judicial activism skirts the
line between the dichotomous pairings of judicial restraint/activism (Sedgwick 1990,
124-125). He then outs himself by appealing for the need of a justice to overturn Roe v.
Wade for the benefit of the country. The constraints of the dichotomous pairings prove to
be unworkable when applied to the practical issue of abortion. After subscribing to calls
for restraint, objective application of the law, and judging based on neutral principles as
his Republican peers do, the Senator allows himself to cross the line drawn between
mutual dependent asymmetrical pairings: suddenly he favors desire instead of reason,
activism instead of restraint. Of course, it is not that Senator Brownback suddenly
changed his mind; it is just that the illogical incoherence of the binarisms were unable to
be maintained when moved from the theoretical and applied to the practical (Burgess
1999, 212-214).
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Brownback’s statements allow the underlying and transitive sexuality that links
the binarisms outlined by Queer New Institutionalism. The dominant spheres are male,
white, heterosexual, utilize reason, exhibit judicial restraint, and apply neutral principles.
But in stating his preferred policy preference to outlaw abortion, Brownback reveals his
desire and appeals to emotions, decrying the exercise of “raw political power” that the
Supreme Court exhibited in deciding Roe v. Wade. But by following the “neutral
principle” of privacy as afforded by the Constitution, the result is that a woman’s right to
choose was found to exist within the document and the result is that “40 million children
have been aborted” and Brownback describes them as “innocent faces that bless our
existence” (Roberts 2005, 47).
He therefore rejects reason and the judicial restraint called for previously, and
instead appeals to the minority spheres of the dichotomous pairings: judicial activism and
a Supreme Court that is a naked power organ to act in overturning Roe v. Wade. He is
then associated with those minorities, such as women, non-whites, homosexuals, which
are oppressed, repressed, discriminated against, and ignored, in allowing his desire for a
policy preference be exhibited. His testimony before the committee thus reveals the
incoherence of the binarisms he and his fellow senators previously reinforced. The
inherent contradiction thus revealed, the Supreme Court is labeled activist for ruling for
privacy in Roe v. Wade, but this also necessitates an activist decision from the body to
overturn such precedent. The closet door was opened during the Roberts confirmation
hearing and the logical inconsistency of neutral principles/naked power organs, judicial
restraint/judicial activism, reason/desire, etc revealed.
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The Nomination of Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme Court
In 2005, Judge Samuel Alito was nominated by President Bush to the Supreme
Court to replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 139).
Alito’s confirmation hearing took place a few months after Chief Justice Robert’s, on
January 9th through the 11th, 2006 (U.S. Senate 2006, iii).
Although Alito was generally praised for his candor in answering questions, there
were also several issues raised repeatedly in attempts to challenge his nomination (U.S
Senate 2006, 516, 559, 574). One such issue was Alito’s failure to recuse himself from
the Vanguard case in 2002, where he decided in a case for a company with which he held
a mutual fund (U.S. Senate 2006, 32, 388). Another was Doe v. Groody, a case where
Alito ruled in favor of police who stripped searched a 10 year old girl after executing a
warrant against a suspected drug dealer (U.S. Senate 2006, 331). These issues were used
to paint Alito as being of questionable ethics by failing to recuse himself as well as
predisposed to ruling in favor of the government.
Using words to reinforce binarisms
Reinforcing binarisms could not have been done more succinctly than when
Senator Specter used the term “flaming liberal” in contrast to an “arch-conservative”
during Alito’s nomination hearing. He stated that, by examining the right set of cases,
Judge Alito could be described as either. By contrasting the pairings and noting that Alito
could be construed within in the confines of either, he is simultaneously identifying and
outlining binarisms, while rejecting their flaws (Alito 2006, 3).
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Flaming liberal thus encapsulates several minority spheres in one term. The word
flaming is normally associated with a homosexual, typically an effete one that is unable
to conceal his sexual orientation, and in this instance is used to describe a liberal. By
pairing the two words, it denotes judicial activism as well as desire, by characterizing
someone as desiring certain progressive policy outcomes. The combination of these
minoritized terms, female, homosexual, desire, and judicial activism, therefore signals a
threat to their valorized counterparts: male, heterosexual, reason, and judicial restraint.
By connecting these minoritized Others, the flaming liberal is elevated to a significant
threat over the arch conservative. By defying predetermined heteropreferential norms, it
is a challenge to their political values as well as their sexuality (Valenti 2008, 94-96;
Burgess 1999, 204).
However, Specter quickly dismantles this dichotomous pairing by noting the ease
in their construction. By selectively assembling cases from Alito’s history as a judge, a
narrative can be crafted to make either association. So while he appeals to stereotypical
conceptions of identity in his willingness to use the terms, Specter also breaks them apart
by showing the futility in applying them to Judge Alito.
Judicial restraint/judicial activism
Similar to what occurred during Robert’s confirmation hearing, senators on the
committee spent a significant amount of time reinforcing the judicial restraint/judicial
activism binarism. Perhaps this is to be expected, given the proximity in time between
Alito and Roberts’ nomination hearings. The binarisms built up over time were again
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proven unworkable by Senator Brownback’s emotional appeal to overturn precedent, and
then joined by Senator DeWine (U.S. Senate 2006, 46-47, 390-391).
White/black
In several instances during Alito’s nomination hearing, a debate arose over the
significance of race. Senator Durbin raises the question of race in reference to the Riley v.
Taylor case, in which the need for removing African Americans on the jury was
discussed. Durbin noted that Alito compared the significance of an all-white jury “as
relevant as the fact that five of the past six Presidents of the United States have been lefthanded” (U.S. Senate 2006, 457). While Durbin is asking Alito to acknowledge the
disparity and power asymmetry associated with white and non-white identities, Alito’s
comments appear to indicate a disregard for race.
By appealing to the power imbalance between racial identification, Durbin wants
Alito to acknowledge the possibility of discrimination based on race. While Durbin does
not invoke sexualized language during this discussion to emphasize his point, it is a
discussion of the white/black binarism and shows Alito operating within it based on prior
comments. The dominant position of whites in society affords them the ability to look at
the world without consideration for race. Although being white is being a part of a race,
that dominant position allows members of the dominant group to assume their position as
being natural (Wing 1997, 45).
Durbin’s emphasis on Alito commenting about the insignificance of all-white
juries in deciding a case against a non-white person is his appeal for Alito to reject
binarisms of white/black. He wants the judge to view the world from the perspective of a

48
person who does take race into account. This is because the non-white individual knows
that others are able to perceive his race in association with others of the minority sphere.
Senator Kyl again invokes the image of lady justice, describing her as blind with
the scales of justice. He uses her to illustrate how we place trust in our system.
Individuals put their freedom and fate into the hands of judges (U.S. Senate 2006, 515).
But while judges do not want to cast decisions based on a person’s identity, Durbin’s
question illustrates the point, without evoking imagery, about the problems that could
arise when judges fail to acknowledge discrimination on the part of other members of
society.
Democratic authority/individual rights
Another persistent theme during Alito’s nomination hearing was the claim from
his opponents that he would be a consistent vote on the Court in favor of the government
and against individual rights. The judge’s ruling in Doe v. Groody illustrates this threat
and was mentioned repeatedly by senators and witnesses before the committee. In that
case, police were issued a warrant to search a man for drugs. It was believed that he hid
drugs on other people within the same premises, so a 10 year old girl was stripped search
and Alito ruled that that was permissible (U.S. Senate 2006, 635). Opponents used this
case to assert that Alito continually gives undue deference to law enforcement and
government authorities.
Senators were concerned with this given the context of the hearings, in which the
President was pushing to extend the limits of executive power in the War on Terrorism.
Alito’s belief in the Unitary Executive Theory was cited by Senator Schumer, one of his
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most vocal opponents on the committee, as reason for concern. Schumer said that Alito’s
“deferential and absolutist” view of the separation of powers between the three branches
of government were concerning, citing his willingness to allow the president to execute
warrantless wiretaps and expand his authority under inherent powers of the Constitution
(U.S. Senate 2006, 37-38).
Witnesses before the committee warned that Alito would pose a threat to
individual rights as well. Predictably, witnesses in favor of civil rights and a woman’s
right to choose were opposed to Alito as a conservative jurist. Fred Gray, a civil rights
attorney, and Kate Michelman, the former president of NARAL Pro-Choice, argue
against his nomination for those reasons (U.S. Senate 2006, 728-733). Berkeley law
professor Goodwin Liu, also argued against Alito’s nomination, arguing that although he
is not an ideologue, his opinions consistently favor the government and impinge on
individual liberties (U.S. Senate 2006, 690-692).
This attempt to place Alito within the confines of the democratic
authority/individual rights binarism, as if there has to be a choice between one or the
other, also results in him being removed or in conflict with the pairing of judicial
restraint/judicial activism. If Alito would give deference to and respect the inherent
powers of the president under the Constitution should be approved for the Supreme
Court, he cannot be coherently argued to be a strict constructionist and a loyal adherent to
judicial restraint. An interpretation of the Constitution that seeks to expand the powers of
the presidency absent an amendment to the document is squarely within the judicial
activist sphere as opposed to the dominant sphere of judicial restraint. Ronald Sullivan, a
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Yale law professor, argues this point, saying that Alito is not always a strict
constructionist and “shifts his interpretive style when necessary to rule in accord with the
government’s interests” (U.S. Senate 2006, 635).
An analysis of the discourse during the nomination hearings of Roberts and Alito
during the 109th Congress might be expected to reveal little sexualized language and few
binary constraints. However, this was shown not to be the case. Judge Roberts and his
supporters in the Senate actively cast him as adhering to judicial restraint by using
“neutral principles” (U.S. Senate 2005, 269-270, 411) and being a “neutral arbiter” (U.S.
Senate 2005, 544). The media, if only briefly, attempted to incite suspicion that Judge
Roberts might be a homosexual, or at least attempted to link him to that suspicion by
characterizing conservatives at Harvard as being a minoritized Other (Scott 2005).
Sexualized language was used during Roberts’ nomination hearing, with Cornyn
describing the federal government under the Articles of Confederation as being
“impotent” and thereby elevating the power of the Constitution within the confines of a
binarism of his own creation (U.S. Senate 2005, 271).
During the Alito nomination hearing, opponents to the president’s selection to
replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor attempted to depict him as being out of the
mainstream and too conservative to replace her on the Court. To illustrate the point,
senators and witnesses alike tried to define Alito within the confines of a democratic
authority/individual rights, saying that he shows deference and inherent belief in a
powerful executive and therefore would upset the separation of powers and checks and
balances between the branches of government. There was also instance of sexualized
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language as Senator Specter used it in drawing attention to the contrasting pairs of a
flaming liberal/arch conservative. However, this was done to refute a binarism in
attempting to define Alito within a construct that lacked nuance and was incoherent (U.S.
Senate 2005, 3).
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3. Supreme Court Nominations during the 111th United States Congress
Democrats, now controlling the Senate, also controlled the Judiciary Committee.
Senator Leahy, formerly ranking member during the 109th Congress, became the Chair.
Former Chairman Specter switched parties and relinquished control of the committee, but
remained on it as a Democrat. During the 109th Congress, there were 10 Republicans and
8 Democrats; for the 111th there were 12 Democrats and 7 Republicans. This included
the addition of Democratic Senators Cardin, Whitehouse, Kaufman, and Franken, as well
as a second woman, Klobuchar. Senator Biden had become Vice President, and Senator
Kennedy had passed away. Republican Senators Sessions, Hatch, Grassley, Kyl, Graham,
Cornyn, and Coburn remained on the committee for the 111th Congress, while Dewine
and Brownback did not. The Supreme Court nominees to be presented before the
committee during the 111th Congress include Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Solicitor
General Elena Kagan (U.S. Senate 2009, 1).
The Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme Court
Judge Sonia Sotomayor was nominated to be an associate justice to the Supreme
Court by President Barack Obama in 2009 to replace retiring Justice Souter. She came to
the committee with 17 years of prior judicial experience. She was also the first Hispanic
nominated to the Supreme Court. Her nomination hearing took place during the summer
of 2009 before the 19 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee in the Hart Senate
Office Building. The nominations proceeded with members asking questions and
discussing her background and qualifications in order of rank for several rounds (U.S.
Senate 2009, 1, 3, 5, 21).
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Many issues were covered during the week of hearings. The nominee was shown
deference afforded her position as an experienced judge, with senators, Democrats and
Republicans alike, referring to her as “Judge Sotomayor” or simply “Judge.” Topics
typical of Supreme Court nomination hearings included discussions surround the Second
Amendment and abortion (U.S. Senate 2009, 20), to less controversial issues such as
allowing TV cameras to record Supreme Court proceedings (U.S. Senate 2009, 51).
Specific to the nominee were several discussions regarding Ricci v. DeStefano, a
case in which she ruled as a federal judge, a dispute involving firefighters in New Haven,
Connecticut and a test used for determining promotions and the use of race. As argued by
Chairman Leahy, Sotomayor followed precedent and ruled unanimously as part of a three
judge panel to defer to the lower District court’s decision. By doing so, Sotomayor
allowed for critics to charge that she was an “activist,” “racist,” and “biased,” even
though Leahy used his time during the nomination hearings to argue the contrary, that she
was following established precedent in deciding the case, which was ultimately
overturned by the Supreme Court (U.S. Senate 2009, 64-65).
Using words to reinforce binarisms
Also specific to the nomination of Sotomayor is criticism from the senators over
remarks she gave during a speech, stating that a “wise Latina” would come to a better
decision than others (U.S. Senate 2009, 7). Republican senators pounced on these
comments, which were also highlighted in major U.S. newspapers (Markon 2009; Nixon
2009; Savage 2009). They use this to further charges that Sotomayor would use gender or
ethnicity in coming to judicial decisions (U.S. Senate 2009, 18, 22-23, 26-27).
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Americans paying attention to the nomination hearings might be confused by
senators highlighting the importance and historic nature of the first Hispanic woman
nominated to the Supreme Court. The praise was accompanied by comments refuting the
importance of identity and background used to influence a judge’s consideration of a case
and approach to the law. There is simultaneous support for the nomination of a diverse
nominee along with criticism of Sotomayor’s acknowledgement of the influence of her
ethnicity and gender. This reflects a shallow reading of the impact and significance such
characteristics play in the lives of Americans that comprise minority groups.
Such perspectives seek to simultaneously acknowledge and dismiss the
importance of identity and reinforce the existing and enduring asymmetrical power
inequalities of America’s social institutions. This is a heterosexist perspective that
continues to place importance on the views of those that constructed our system of
governance: rich, white, males who enshrined discrimination into the Constitution. The
tradition of considering racially inferior African Americans as well as depriving women
of political and individual rights is a perspective that can easily order others to disregard
considerations of race or gender in decision-making.
Analogies are often invoked in order to place people in the situation of others. It is
an attempt to see the world from the perspective of someone unlike oneself. However,
such exercises are limited because individuals are unable to remove the lense through
which they view the world to completely experience what it is like to look through the
lense of someone else. One who identifies with a particular group cannot escape looking
at the world from behind that identity (Wing 1997, 44-45). For example, white people
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look at the world through the context of being white and even though it is a race, they do
not see the world through a racial lense because of the dominant position of whites in
society (Wing 1997, 45). Therefore, a system constructed from the dominant position is
unable to allow for those belonging to the dominant group to completely understand how
being subjugated, in practice and through tradition, perpetuates through the use of
language or continued actions and behaviors that seek to require minorities to ignore the
significance of their status within those groups.
Adding to discussions of groups in America, minorities and women are placed in
dichotomous pairings that ignore other subsets. Therefore individuals who belong within
multiple minority groups, such as black women or Hispanic women, are further isolated
(Wing 1997, 306; Crewnshaw 2000, 210-214). Justice Sotomayor, as a Hispanic woman,
belongs to two outgroups. This could allow her a perspective critical of the prevailing
heterosexist conceptions of society where a “neutral” position is synonymous with the
white, male perspective.
In discussing these Wise Latina remarks made by Judge Sotomayor, Republican
Senator Graham indicates his concerns with the comments. He notes that, "If I had said
anything remotely like that, my career would have been over” (U.S. Senate 2009, 27).
This once again appeals to the heteronormative standard of ignoring race, gender, and the
traditional and persistently dominant role white men have played in the construction and
maintenance of our social institutions. For a white male to ask an individual who is of
multiple outgroups, in this case Hispanic women, to be blind to identity is to accept de
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facto legitimacy of the prevailing view maintained by the dominant ingroup, white men
(Burgess 1999, 202-203).
Therefore, ignoring identity is not necessarily synonymous with equality and
acceptance of all individuals regardless of their demographics. It is instead an appeal to
the status quo by an appeal for “gender blindness,” where in this case ignoring gender
delivers default legitimacy to the patriarchal conceptions of society (Alvesson and
Sköldberg 2009, 237). By calling for judges that ignore race and gender, Graham is
appealing to “universal rationality” that does not discriminate, but while ignoring
identity, reinforces already institutionalized versions of discrimination where gender
restraints are already functioning (Butler 1990, 12).
Graham proceeds to muse about his responsibility as a member of the committee:
“If I give you this robe to put you on the Supreme Court…” He embarks upon the same
line of thinking as Weschler as identified by Burgess. In speaking in terms of
clothed/unclothed, he couples restraint with reason, and being unclothed/naked with
activism and desire (Burgess 1999, 208,213). He states that Sotomayor’s comments,
including the Wise Latina speech, allow him a view of how she behaves “outside the
courtroom without the robe” (U.S. Senate 2009, 27-28). In other words, outside of the
courtroom, Sotomayor is free to act in ways that might not be acceptable for a Supreme
Court justice. This is similar to the view expressed by Wechsler as deconstructed by
Burgess. While more explicit and utilizing a more abstract metaphor, Wechsler described
the Supreme Court clothed in “neutrality” as in opposition to one that operates as a
“naked power organ” (Wechsler 1959, 12, 19). Burgess describes his article, which
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utilizes sexualized language, to embrace the binarism that underlies his argument, that the
debate is a choice between judicial restraint and judicial activism or reason and desire. A
Supreme Court that is clothed in neutrality is therefore seen as legitimate within this
construction, by making use of logic and restraint, as opposed to the perverse nature of an
unchanged and impassioned judiciary, one which is activist and driven by desire to reach
decisions (Burgess 1999, 208).
This is similar to the imagery invoked by Graham. Sotomayor, without the
restraint of her “robe” is free to reveal her true self when she makes appearances in
public. Sotomayor, in delivering her Wise Latina speech, effectively “takes the robe off
and says that their experience makes them better than someone else,” according to
Graham (U.S. Senate 2009, 27). He discloses that he must decide whether or not to allow
her access to the robe of a Supreme Court justice. He happens to have power as a senator
(and a man) to decide if she (a woman) will be appointed to the Supreme Court (to a
position that has been traditionally closed off to women). If he deems that she conforms
to his expectations, he will give her the robe. He must decide if he can “clothe” her
perceived judicial activism. By appointing her to the highest court in the land, Graham
uses the robe figuratively to express his desire for her to be judicially restrained, but fears
openly that she will continue to act nakedly, pursuing her passions and desires as an
activist without restraint. Ironically, he must eschew her legal record in order to express
his desire, for her to conform to his preferences and not act on hers.
Sotomayor’s “fidelity” to the law is challenged throughout the hearings. This is
despite her firm commitment and explicit comments to the contrary,
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"In the past month, many Senators have asked me about my judicial
philosophy. Simple: fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is
not to make law, it is to apply the law" (U.S. Senate 2009, 59).
Despite this assurance, backed up by her record as a judge, Sotomayor is challenged by
Republican senators who believe that her previous comments in speeches that recognize
identity are a threat to a restrained interpretation of the Constitution. Senator Cornyn, a
Republican from Texas, describes his difficulty in reconciling her fidelity to the law as
well as her past statements which recognize identity,
“I am struggling a little bit to understand how your statement about physiological
differences could affect the outcome or affect judging and your stated
commitment to fidelity to the law as being your sole standard and how any litigant
can know where that will end” (U.S. Senate 2009, 330).
The repeated use of the word “fidelity” in Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing
should initiate debate on how it perpetuates heterosexist constructions within
government, instead of just its use to indicate oppositional choice between the U.S.
Constitution and the recognition of identity. First, it invokes a continued heterosexist
conception of the Constitution and U.S. law because it appeals to already established
patriarchal and heterosexual norms: that a woman should be married to a man, who is the
head of a family unit (Burgess 1999, 203-204).
Within this conception, the U.S. Constitution is the authority to which one is to
submit, much like the man is for the family, as husband and father he is the leader of the
household and the authority to which members obey. The expectation is that a good wife
will submit to her husband and remain loyal to him, and that this fidelity to him is to be
rewarded, whereas disloyalty –cheating on her husband and infidelity – is to be shunned
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by society and threatens the family. In the same way, Sotomayor, as a woman, must
submit to the Constitution and remain loyal to it, rejecting anything that strays from its
authority which would also threaten pre-established heterosexual, patriarchal norms.
Feminists also critique the idea that men should demand that women claim
fidelity to the U.S. Constitution. Catherine MacKinnon (2005) addresses this directly.
She argues that it is a document which was crafted without her consent or the consent of
women. She believes a moralizing view of the Constitution is one that sees it from the
top-down in deciding what is good and bad, but that instead it should be crafted from the
bottom-up, from the practical to the theoretical. In so doing it would reconcile how the
Constitution permits the perpetuation of inequality, regardless of some principled
approach to calling certain practices good or bad.
MacKinnon believes that fidelity works both ways, and that in order for her to be
loyal to it, it must also be loyal to women. For example, she notes that the Constitution
would be made more legitimate in the eyes of women were it to include an Equal Rights
Amendment, so that when it did, women would see it as being more legitimate than
compared with how it is now (MacKinnon 2005, 66-67, 70). The feminist perspective
allows for a critique of the demands for “fidelity” to the Constitution, which suggests
acquiescence to the heteronormative ideal. It demands that women, even as justices, act
according to established cultural norms which serve as the basis for institutions like the
Supreme Court. Simultaneously, putting nominees on the spot and refuting them en
masse, as Republicans criticize Sotomayor for her Wise Latina remarks, ensures that
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alternative interpretations are downplayed or refuted before justices make it onto the
bench.
The nomination of Sotomayor to the Supreme Court followed the prediction of
Gibson and Caldeira (2009), where those that support a nominee attempt to emphasize
their “judiciousness” and the opponents to the nominee stress that they are biased or out
of the ideological mainstream compared to the rest of Americans (Gibson and Caldeira
2009, 140). In this case, Democratic senators such as Schumer, Leahy, and Klobuchar
served as advocates for Sotomayor, emphasizing her legal record and judiciousness (U.S.
Senate 2009, 24, 128-132, 360, 420). Conversely, Republican senators such as Sessions,
Kyl, and Grassley use their time to demonstrate that she is biased or could be prejudiced
in her rulings if confirmed (U.S. Senate 2009, 6-7, 16-17, 21-23).
Judicial nominations do not operate in a vacuum. The public is made aware of the
nominee after the president makes his selection months before the confirmation hearing.
Americans get their information regarding candidates through elites, such as the media
and interest groups. Opponents to the nominee will attempt to frame the debate to
emphasize political controversies in order to derail the confirmation (Gibson and Caldeira
2009, 142). This appears to have worked in the case of Sotomayor. Senator Klobuchar
relays a story in which she was in the airport prior to the nomination hearings, when an
airport worker and constituent from her home state asked “are you going to vote for that
woman?” The worker explained to the senator their concern that Sotomayor would let her
“emotions get in front of the law” (U.S. Senate 2009, 36).
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This exchange captures the debate of Sotomayor’s concern for empathy in
deciding cases. Through the nomination hearings, senators raised objections to the judge
due to the fact that she might allow her feelings and emotions color her judgment in
deciding cases. This plays within the reason versus desire binarism (Burgess 1999, 208)
and in this instance links directly to the binarism of judicial restraint versus activism. The
discussion illuminates the asymmetrical power relationship between the dichotomous
pairings. Judicial restraint and reason are seen as the preferred approaches to the law, and
the focus on Sotomayor’s empathy allows for skepticism in her capabilities as a judge:
she might use activism and her desire to further her preferences in regards to the law.
The fact that a constituent asked a senator if she would vote for “that woman”
demonstrates the effectiveness elites had in framing the debate regarding Sotomayor’s
nomination prior to the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Newspapers
reported on what were argued to be controversial aspects of Sotomayor’s past (Markon
2009). This allowed for senators to capitalize on questions of her judicial temperament
and capacity for allowing emotions into consideration in her rulings. President Obama,
when nominating Sotomayor, said "depth and breadth of one's empathy" and "their
broader vision of what America should be” was critical for judges (U.S. Senate 2009, 6).
Senator Sessions, during the hearings, said “call it empathy, call it prejudice, or call it
sympathy, but whatever it is, it is not law” (U.S. Senate 2009, 7).
These words were all spoken by persons other than Sotomayor. Again, despite her
lengthy resume and years of service as a judge, those that were opposed to her were able
to frame the debate by raising questions and drawing suspicion of her record. The word
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“empathy” served as a trigger, evoking disdain for anyone who would refute reason in
favor of desire. In this framework, the two are diametrically opposed. The question of her
ability to rule fairly as a judge was so suspect that it gave rise to the term “empathy
standard” in regards to the possibility that she would consider emotions (U.S. Senate 209,
6, 40).
By making the word empathy something worthy of derision and suspicion,
Sotomayor’s opponents were able to couple it with doubts over her ability to rule with
restraint. If she is willing to consider identity and heritage, as her Wise Latina comments
show, if she is willing to give consideration to the positions of others and has empathy for
those that come before her, then she will be willing to go beyond what is demanded by
the law and the Constitution and rule in favor of her unreasoned preferences. She will be
an activist, giving consideration to standards outside of the heteropatriarchal norms.
The effectiveness of framing the nomination within these binarisms, restraint
versus activism and reason versus desire, put Sotomayor and her supporters on the
defensive. Sotomayor herself spent time, when talking about rulings she delivered in
prior cases, to note that despite where her sympathies lied, she followed what was
demanded by the law in delivering her rulings (U.S. Senate 2009, 72). Senator Klobuchar
went through a painstaking process to detail rulings made by Sotomayor in which the
average person would have sympathy for one side, but in which case the judge rules in
favor of the other in accordance with the law (U.S. Senate 2009, 127-128).
The fact that the constituent referred to Sotomayor as “that woman” in a
conversation with a woman senator, Klobuchar, shows that the framing of Sotomayor as
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an activist, empathetic Other was effective, to the point that a senator felt the need to use
her time before the committee to publicly acknowledge and refute the constituent’s
concern. Sotomayor is unlike Klobuchar and other women, who are normal, reasoned,
principled, restrained. Sotomayor, as “that woman,” is a threat to the established order. It
reveals the asymmetrical power balance that is given to the framework of the debate
when it is confined to binarisms. Judicial restraint and solid, reasoned judicial decisions
are the preferred path and anything Other than that is detrimental.
Using metaphors to reinforce binarisms
Aside from being replete with baseball analogies, which is a traditionally
American and male dominated sport, the nomination hearings provided ample
opportunity for other metaphors to manifest themselves. They served a useful purpose
within the context of the nomination hearings to explain the position of Sotomayor as a
judge within American society. For example, Senator Sessions, a Republican from
Alabama, explained that without the limit of being “restrained by precedent and the threat
of reversal from higher courts,” Judge Sotomayor’s judicial philosophy, and by extension
her latent activism, will be “allowed to reach full bloom” (U.S. Senate 2009, 7). Either
this suggests that Sotomayor’s full capacity as a judge is thus far restrained and will be
able to grow into activism should she be confirmed to the Supreme Court, or it indicates a
level of disingenuousness in her capacity as a judge. It suggests that as a judge she is not
ruling in accordance with mainstream understandings of the law, but is instead playing a
role in order to serve her own agenda. In this instance, that agenda is to be confirmed to
the highest court in order to become unrestrained and thus unchained by things such as
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precedent and the threat of reversal from higher courts. In either case, the use of such a
language device does not comport with Sotomayor’s history as a judge for 17 years (U.S.
Senate 2009, 123).
Metaphors are devices used to attribute a characteristic from one thing onto
something else (Hegstrom and McCarl-Nielsen 2002, 220). But more importantly,
metaphors serve as symbolic shortcuts. They serve the purpose of attributing deeper
meaning to a subject indirectly. It allows the speaker to address the subject without
directly confronting a particular aspect of that person. It is therefore able to accomplish
the description of a thing using few words that otherwise would take a list of
characteristics. It is in this capacity that we find the ability of Session’s blooming
metaphor to transmit larger meaning (Hegstrom and McCarl-Nielsen 2002, 223). A
flower is used to describe a woman, which is common in American culture. It associates
her with fragility, nature, beauty, softness, and delicateness (Hegstrom and McCarlNielsen 2002, 228). This reinforces a common double-standard, in which men are seen as
rough and strong and women are soft and delicate. Men are hard-working and provide,
while women are nurturing and take care of the home (Valenti 2008, 22-25).
Using a metaphor can also invoke stereotypes without their explicit mention. As
Banaji and Hardin (1996) found, stereotypes can be invoked without explicit reference,
with certain words or combinations of words used to serve as code for implicit gender
roles. For example, certain occupations are explicitly gendered, like a fireman or
waitress, but there are also implicitly gendered occupations, such as doctor and nurse.
This is important because judgments are made based on gender roles automatically
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without explicitly acknowledging the gender. The English language is replete with
gendered words and phrases, but this can be implicit as well as explicit (Banaji and
Hardin 1996, 136, 141). So again, by utilizing the flower metaphor, the listener can be
reminded about the implicit gender role of a judge, which is a position most commonly
held by men.
It is in such comments that the underlying heterosexist conceptions of our
governmental institutions are revealed. Language that appeals to the senses by using
metaphors and invoking imagery associated with modesty, reproduction, growth, and
sexuality, such as the idea of clothing nakedness and covering that which might offend,
as well as comparing Judge Sotomayor to a flower not fully in bloom. Referencing a
flower not fully bloomed is an unnecessary appeal to emphasize Sotomayor’s gender,
while using sexualized imagery to suggest that she might not be fully developed in her
judicial philosophy or feign judicial modesty in a subversive attempt to obtain a higher
position in government. By using such an appeal, the speaker is able to undermine the
judge’s credibility, despite nearly two decades of experience, in order to question her
motivations and highlight the risk associated with appointed a justice that is a woman by
linking her with judicial activism (U.S. Senate 2009, 16).
By repeatedly mentioning the Wise Latina remarks (U.S. Senate 2009, 123),
Republican senators effectively structured their argument against Sotomayor within the
constraints of the judicial restraint/judicial activism and reason/desire binarisms. They
highlight comments that suggest she might be an activist on the Supreme Court and has
previously signaled a willingness to take into consideration identity as an influence in
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decision-making (U.S. Senate 2009, 425, 493). Such criticisms of Sotomayor’s speech on
the part of senators on the committee forced her to backtrack and apologize, calling the
remarks a “rhetorical flourish that fell flat” (U.S. Senate 2009, 73). Advocates for her
nomination on the committee came to her defense. Senator Durbin noted the context
within which she spoke them. Senator Klobuchar mentioned that she made the
controversial comments before her confirmation by the committee when nominated to the
lower court and they went unnoticed or were not criticized back then. Senator Specter
stated that people were making a “mountain out of a molehill” and noted the reference of
other prior nominees to their life experience and background (U.S. Senate 2009, 144,
357, 373).
Judicial restraint/judicial activism
Democratic Senator Feingold tells viewers at the beginning of Sotomayor’s
nomination hearing to be wary of the term “activist,” as it often denotes a "a judge who
decides a case in a way you don't like" (U.S. Senate 2009, 20). Senator Franken tells
Sotomayor that he is concerned that “activism is on the rise,” but he also states that he
agrees with Feingold’s definition, that often people use the term to describe a judge that
rules in ways they do not like (U.S. Senate 2009, 53). Republican Senator Cornyn uses a
different definition of activism in which he says it can be a good thing, "if it is enforcing
the rights and the laws that have been passed by the legislative branch," but that it is a
bad thing if it involves "inventing new rights" and "veering off this course of enforcing a
written text" (U.S. Senate 2009, 33). This reinforces Gibson and Caldeira’s (2009)
position that charges of judicial activism can complicate and obscure debates regarding a
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nominee’s judicial qualifications, the following of stare decisis, and arguments based on
policy and political ideology (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 143).
While Democratic senators might be assuaged to know, as Senator Sessions tells
Franken, that there can be conservative activists as well as liberal, it is the Republican
senators that go on the assault against activism, which they appear to place on liberal
judges (U.S. Senate 2009, 6). The Republican senators spend a significant amount of
their time deriding activism and the judicial decisions made by activists in the judicial
branch (U.S. Senate 2009, 22, 26-27, 33-34, 407, 425, 454). Democratic senators also
subscribe to this framework of the debate, by ceding territory within the debate in
emphasizing Sotomayor’s judicial temperament and her modesty (U.S. Senate 2009, 14
24, 54-55, 77, 94, 127).
Sotomayor herself rejects the debate within the framework of activism versus
restraint and instead characterizes constitutional questions and arguments regarding the
law as having "no objective stance but only a series of perspectives. No neutrality, no
escape from choice in judging" (U.S. Senate 2009, 122). However, Sotomayor’s position
does not have to be acknowledged by the committee itself, which adheres to a view that
places judging solely within the confines of a dichotomous relationship, between judicial
restraint and activism.
The Nomination of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme Court
Elena Kagan was nominated to be the fourth woman to serve on the United States
Supreme Court in 2010 by President Obama. It marked President Obama's second
nomination to the Court. She was selected to replace retiring liberal justice John Paul
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Stevens. Although she had no prior judicial experience, Kagan was dean of Harvard Law
School and later the solicitor general for the United States (Baker 2010).
Not having prior judicial experience, but extensive academic experience in the
area of the law, Kagan’s nomination hearing focused on prominent issues within her
tenure as dean at Harvard Law School. Primarily, emphasis was placed on her role as
dean when military recruiters were prohibited from using the law schools facilities due to
a conflict between the institution’s non-discrimination policy and the military’s Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell policy, which barred lesbians and gays from serving openly (Baker 2010).
Republican senators pounced on this issue as an opportunity to show that Kagan did not
adhere to the rule of law (Kagan 2010, Day 2, 60:00).
This issue area appeals directly to the binarisms identified by Burgess, such as
heterosexuality versus homosexuality and judicial restraint versus activism. Calls for
investigation into Kagan’s sexuality began on May 11, 2010, when the Wall Street
Journal published an old photograph of Kagan playing softball on the front page of the
paper (Appendix B). Although they did not explicit mention Kagan’s sexuality, other
national newspapers capitalized on the appearance of the photo in the Wall Street Journal
to initiate a debate regarding sexuality and the persistence of stereotypes (Fermino 2010).
The publication of the photo played upon assumptions and widely held
stereotypes regarding the definition and appearance stereotypically associated with
lesbians. By using a picture of Kagan playing softball, a women’s sport that is also
traditionally popular among lesbians, the Wall Street Journal was able to invoke a
reaction. Other newspapers used it to begin debates regarding Kagan’s sexuality as well
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(Fermino 2010; Washington 2010). Most of these played upon suspicion of violation of
heterosexual norms. Besides Kagan’s appearance, a softball player with short hair, she
was also a successful professional with an academic career, middle-aged, unmarried, and
without children (Washington 2010). It should be questioned as to why the appearance of
a woman and how she compares to the appearance of other women has anything to do
with her qualifications to hold a position within government, not to mention that is it the
highly salient and respectable position of Supreme Court justice (King 1991, 3).
These characteristics played well together to allow Kagan to be criticized as a
nominee in much the same way as Sotomayor. The characteristics of her as a nominee
violated the traditional sexist interpretations regarding the role of women: that they marry
a man and have children, instead of remaining single and pursuing a career (Burgess
1999, 203-204). The photograph of Kagan playing softball added another element to
draw suspicion: that she might be homosexual. These factors placed her firmly within the
outgroups established by normative constraints on governmental and social institutions. It
also signifies a double standard, in which a woman’s relationship status is deemed a valid
point of discussion and pertinent in assessing her for a public position. The same scrutiny
would not be afforded an unmarried male counterpart (Marcus 2010). While Roberts’
sexuality was discussed implicitly in the national media, it did not appear to gain traction
(Scott 2005; Appendix C). A single, career professional woman without children was a
threat to the order established in which men, the patriarchal heads of the family unit, are
seen as the dominant authority figure (Butler 1990, 3, 39).
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In the context of these articles published in the national media, the nomination
hearing for Kagan before the Senate Judiciary Committee is seen in a different light.
While the senators do not explicitly acknowledge the photograph or question her
sexuality, her opponents focus on issues which draw attention to her Otherness and as
being a member of those outgroups in the dichotomous pairings: a woman, a judicial
activist, and a homosexual or one that sympathizes with homosexuals. All of these, in
combination, threaten the pre-established heteropatriarchal order (Burgess 1999, 204;
LeMoncheck 1997, 38).
Using words to reinforce binarisms
Given that Kagan does not have the prior judicial experience like Sotomayor,
senators had to review her written works, career history, and use their time during the
hearings to investigate her judicial philosophy and temperament (Washington 2010). This
appeared to be a problem for some of the senators, given that many of them lapsed in
giving her deference in her position as dean of Harvard Law and Solicitor General of the
United States. While Democratic Senators were consistent in referring to her as Dean or
General Kagan, Republicans frequently referred to her as Miss Kagan, although not in
every single instance (Kagan 2010).
While this in itself does not constitute sexualized language used to reinforce a
Queer New Institutionalist approach to constitutional theory, it does contribute to the
heterosexist conceptions of individuals. Men are given deference as they are usually
called mister or assigned titles, such as senator, president, judge, etc. These are
indications of accomplishment. Conversely, women are assigned titles based on their
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relationships to men (King 1991, 3, 46). By referring to her as Miss Kagan instead of
General or Dean Kagan, it puts one more small emphasis on her position as a member of
multiple outgroups and raises suspicions regarding her capacity to carry out her duties
should she be confirmed as a justice (Crenshaw 2000). It continually reminds listeners
that Kagan is single and has not conformed normatively by marrying a man and taking
his last name.
Using metaphors to reinforce binarisms
Like during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, a number of metaphors were
employed during Kagan’s nomination hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Held in the summer of 2010, senators on the committee took turns to investigate Kagan’s
record to determine her fitness to serve on the highest court in the land. It marks an event
in which the senators, as well as Americans, are able to get to know the president’s
nominee to the Supreme Court.
On the first day of the hearings, Republican Senator Sessions asks Kagan if, given
her lack of experience, she is able to remain within the “harness of the law” (Kagan 2010,
Day 1, 27:00). This, once again, is an appeal to the dichotomous relationship between
restraint and activism in approaching constitutional theory. Sessions uses a simple
metaphor to inquire as to Kagan’s fidelity and adherence to the law, a refutation of
judicial activism, and operations within the confines he expects of a nominee to the
Supreme Court. It is misleading to the inquiry as to Kagan’s judicial philosophy because
it subscribes to an objective reading of the Constitution, one which does not exist.
Justices are not democratically elected and are instead appointed by the President. They
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are removed from the electorate and are therefore given no direct mandate from the
country’s citizens (Burgess 1999, 205; U.S. Senate 2009, 463; Gibson and Caldeira 2009,
142).
Sessions’ metaphor again evokes a contrast between the heterosexist norm that is
preferred and the candidate presented before the committee: Kagan. As a single woman,
focused on her career, she is not conforming to the expected role attributed to women in
our society. As an individual outside the confines of the patriarchal family, she is thus
marginalized (Burgess 1999, 204). Also, as not having a prior role as a judge, senators
have to rely on her professional writings and career as an academic and solicitor general
in order to assess her judiciousness and political ideology (Gibson and Caldeira 2009,
140). By asking how Kagan would operate within the confines, or the “harness,” of the
law, the senator subscribed to stereotypes and assumptions argued by a Queer New
Institutionalist approach. He could have asked what reason he had to believe that Kagan
would not operate within the confines of the law, instead of the opposite.
Other metaphors were utilized by opponents during Kagan’s nomination hearing.
On the last day of the hearings before the committee, witnesses were called to present
their support or opposition to the nominee publicly before the committee. The
individuals, many of whom represent interest groups and political organizations, submit
their comments for the records and also answer questions posed by the senators on the
committee. Compared to the opinions expressed by the senators regarding the nominee,
the statements made by witnesses before the committee are much more aggressive,
pointed, and politically adversarial (Kagan 2010, Day 4).
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One such witness for the minority Republicans on the committee was Robert Alt
from the Heritage Foundation. In his comments before the committee, he assailed Kagan.
Alt speaks out against liberal activism, which he distinguishes from conservative
activism. He argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United case was
activism which overturned precedent, but which returned to an even older precedent. This
is opposed to the Court's decision in Austin v. Chamber of Commerce. In his
characterization, that was an instance of liberal activism in which the Court embraced
speech equalization theory which ignored precedent in a way incomparable to the
Citizens United ruling (Kagan 2010, Day 4, 130:00).
While Alt's testimony is a more general critique of activism in general,
specifically liberal activism, he links it in the end to the nomination of Kagan, who he
suggests would be another member of the liberal wing of the Court, ready to overturn
historic precedent. No such instances of explicit sexualized language were used by
witnesses testifying against Sotomayor (U.S. Senate 2009). By utilizing sexualized
language, he is able to manipulate imagery that is threatening to the average human
being. An “orphaned eunuch,” as he describes the legislation after the ruling from a
liberal activist court, is one which cannot reproduce and lacks the capability to fend for
itself (Kagan 2010, Day 4, 130:00). Without parents, an orphan is alone in the world and
vulnerable. The imagery of a eunuch suggests castration, which is a threat to the
reestablished conception of society, where the patriarchal family is the basic unit. The
assumed dominance of men is thus threatened by such an activist Court. With its liberal
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agenda, it can lash out at that which it sees as detrimental to society and remove its ability
to reproduce, thereby rendering it useless and invalid.
Judicial restraint/judicial activism
The focus on the issue of the military’s Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) and
additional questions on the possible legal future for the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), demonstrate further attempts to frame the debate within the confines of
heterosexual versus homosexual and judicial restraint versus judicial activism
dichotomies. By focusing on issues that deal with homosexuality, senators are able to
indirectly remind Americans about the questions previously raised regarding the
speculation about Kagan’s sexuality while also dealing with possible upcoming issues
(Kagan 2010, Day 3, 168:00, 336:00, 394:00). These issues are ones that are able to fit
well within the confines of the debate between activism and restraint. Since public
opinion on questions regarding homosexuality continue to evolve, and it is probable that
at least one of them will come before the Court, they serve as the perfect area of focus for
opponents. If Kagan has already been the subject of suspicion raised in national
newspapers over her sexuality, then attempts to characterize her as a judicial activist in
regards to issues of homosexuality could prove beneficial to her opponents.
Such charges of activism again provoke her defenders, Democrats on the
committee, to come to her aid. Senator Schumer notes also that she is “judicially modest”
(Kagan 2010, Day 2, 439:00). Kagan herself talks about having restraint and humility
during the hearing. Senator Kyl asks Kagan if she can be a neutral arbiter, which again
suggests that he has reason to believe that so far she is not or has not been neutral in her
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approach to the law (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 82:30). Senator Graham asks if her “activism
can be parked” (Kagan 2010, Day 1, 99:20). While he may be referring to her role as the
“advocate” for the government’s position as the solicitor general, it might also suggest
that he does not necessarily expect her to be restrained. This is directly within the
confines of the restraint versus activism debate. Multiple senators cast doubts over
Kagan’s ability to adhere to the Constitution and the law by characterizing her as
unrestrained, unable to approach the law in an unbiased fashion. So from a position in
which she came into the hearings under suspicious and scrutiny of the public eye for her
identity or what her identity was expected to be, Kagan continued to be criticized and
judged harshly as one who would violate the constraints of the system; she would reject
restraint in judging and instead work as an activist.
The debates during Kagan’s nomination hearing are therefore place firmly within
the theoretical confines of the judicial restraint versus activism binarism. Even Kagan
allows this construction of the debate regarding constitutional theory to be maintained. At
one point during the hearing, Democratic Senator Whitehouse mentions the rise in 5-4
decisions on the Supreme Court. He cites this as evidence that the Court is divided and
that judges follow their own personal policy preferences. He is refuted by Kagan herself.
She explains that it means justices have honest disagreements about the law and that it is
not indicative of personal preferences being followed. (Kagan 2010, Day 3, 32:00).
Perhaps it is easier for Kagan to refute Whitehouse than acknowledge an
argument outside the simple constraints of the restraint versus activism dichotomous
pairing. She does not have a judicial record, not having previously served as a judge, and
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therefore can refute suggestions that she is an activist as there is no prior proof. Instead of
having to defend an alternate conception of constitutional theory or how the justices on
the Supreme Court reach their decisions, she can deflect criticism by using her own
record and history to refute criticism within the confines of the restraint versus activism
frame, even if it is flawed in practice (Burgess 1999, 204-205).
The confirmation hearings for Sotomayor and Kagan to the Supreme Court during
the 111th Congress focused on controversial issues from their past. Sotomayor was
charged with being an activist, as charged by Senators citing her Wise Latina comments
and ruling in the Ricci case. This helped reinforce male/female, white/non-white,
reason/desire, and judicial restraint/judicial activism binarisms in attempts to raise
suspicions and associate her with the marginalized Other. Kagan faced questions from
opponents regarding her history as Dean of Harvard Law and policies implemented to
challenge Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and the Solomon Amendment. This appeals to the
constraints imposed by male/female, reason/desire, heterosexual/homosexual, and
judicial restraint/judicial activism binarisms. It too was used to cast doubt on the nominee
as to her judicial fitness to represent preconceived norms regarding society and
governmental institutions. Specifically, questions were raised about the fitness of the
nominees to conform to the expected heteropatriarchal standards necessary to serve as
Supreme Court justices (U.S. Senate 2009; Kagan 2010; Sedgwick 10-11; Burgess 1999,
207-217).
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4. Results and discussion
Results
There is no doubt that Supreme Court nomination hearings are partisan affairs.
Congress is a political body, and the nominees are selected by the president, and therefore
it is to be expected that Republican presidents are likely to nominate conservative judges
to the Court and Democratic presidents are likely to nominate liberal justices. After
reviewing the nomination hearings of the four most recently appointed Supreme Court
justices, the pattern established by Gibson and Caldiera (2009). According to the authors,
nominees are examined to see if they have the professional qualifications to serve on the
highest court in the land. Their records and judicial temperament is also probed to
determine if it falls within the mainstream of American politics (140, 143).
Gibson and Caldiera found that during Alito’s nomination hearing, the nominee
focused on his judicial qualifications and downplayed political issues in order to secure
confirmation (144). This was also true of Roberts, Sotomayor, and Kagan. As they
explain, charges of “judicial activism” can complicate the proceedings, and this was true
of the nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 109th and 111th
Congresses. While all four of the nominees receiving confirmation from the entire
Senate, this was not without having to endure criticism and inflation of possible
controversies (Gibson and Caldiera 139, 141; Savage 2009; Baker 2010).
What happens in the nomination hearings does not occur within a vacuum. The
senators submit for the record editorials from prominent newspapers during the hearings.
This suggests that they are receptive to the commentary circulating on the Hill as the
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nomination proceeds. Thus, one must be alert to these narratives that might arise in the
outside media, as they may produce an indirect influence on the hearings themselves.
Senators may be prompted by revelations in the media to initiate a line of questioning
that, observed in isolation, could be taken at face value and not extend to a secondary
meaning that referenced the outside sources pressuring particular committee members to
pursue certain inquiries.
Double standards
Roberts and Alito, two married white men, were appointed by a Republican
president and confirmed by a Republican Senate. Conversely, Sotomayor and Kagan, a
Hispanic woman and a white woman, both single, were appointed by a Democratic
president and confirmed by a Democratic Senate. Applying the theory of Queer New
Institutionalism allows for a critical examination of the implications and effects of
reinforcing binarisms. Dichotomous pairings represent asymmetrical power balances that
are inherently unstable (Sedgwick 1990, 10; Burgess 1999, 200-201). If the prescription
of Queer New Institutionalism is to be proven correct, then the reinforcement of
binarisms will occur regardless of the political leanings of the individuals involved.
Republican senators utilize them in the nomination hearings of conservative nominees to
the Court, just as likely as Democratic senators use them in the nomination hearings of
liberal nominees. This has been demonstrated in an analysis of the nomination hearings
for Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The maintenance of binarisms occurred
regardless of party identification of the senators on the committee or the nominee before
them.
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The implications for the nominees were quite different when comparing those of
the 109th Congress, Roberts and Alito, and those of the 111th Congress, Sotomayor and
Kagan. Conspicuously absent from the nomination hearings of Roberts or Alito are any
mention of the potential that their judicial philosophies could be allowed to “bloom” if
appointed to the Supreme Court. There is no mention of “orphaned eunuchs” (U.S.
Senate 2005; U.S. Senate 2006). And although the New York Times implied it, no
significant tests of Roberts’ sexual orientation migrated to the nomination hearing itself
(Scott 2005). However, questions about Kagan’s sexuality and the subsequent focus on
issues relevant to LGBT equality were central controversies during her confirmation
hearings (Appendices B, C).
Questions regarding Roberts’ sexuality were in the form of a photograph
published in the New York Times, coupled with the comparison of his association with
conservatives at Harvard with queers as marginalized Others, apparently never gained
traction. This is probably due to the fact that he is married and his wife and kids were
present during his confirmation hearing (U.S. Senate 2005, 1). This reinforces
Sedgwick’s point in realizing that the binary pairs allow for the creation of identity and
not just action. It does not matter who Roberts is attracted to and what sex he engages in,
because he conforms to (most) heteropreferential ideals. He is married (even though it
occurred later in life) and he has children (even though they were adopted). However, the
suspicion associated with Kagan’s nomination and her potential to be a lesbian was more
blatant and enduring. After a photo of her playing softball was published in the Wall
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Street Journal (Appendix B), other major newspapers ran with the theme in more explicit
terms.
The New York Post reran the picture with the headline, “Does this photo suggest
high court nominee Elena Kagan is a lesbian?” (Fermino 2010). It does not matter what
the content of the article said after that leading condemnation. The closet door is thus
opened, and regardless as to whether or not Kagan is in there, the suspicion remains. The
Chicago Sun Times was more accurate with its headline, “Stereotypes spur question on
Kagan” (Washington 2010). Still, it is unfair to pose such a question for a number of
reasons.
Rumors, gossip, and suggestive innuendo regarding the sexual orientation of
Supreme Court nominees proved to be a sexist endeavor, showing preferential treatment
to heterosexual norms. While these questions of sexuality were raised in regards to Kagan
and Roberts, they did not persist in the same ways. Roberts was a married man with
children, therefore suspicion that he was gay subsided. This is despite photographic
evidence of him holding a pie in the 1980s. However, since Kagan is a single woman in
her 50s, a photograph of her enjoying softball in the 1990s allows questions of her
sexuality to persist (Scott 2005; Fermino 2010). It is a persistent suspicion that continues
to present day. Google searches for the names of each of the nominees reveal the top
searches for Kagan to include “Elena Kagan gay” and “Elena Kagan husband.” The same
is not true for the single Justice Sotomayor, who is of a similar age, and Chief Justice
Roberts, whose sexuality was questioned as well, or for the married Justice Alito
(Appendix C).
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An unfair assumption based on stereotypes regarding Kagan’s sexuality is also
suggestive of other factors predicted by Queer New Institutionalism, as demonstrated in
the discourse analysis during her nomination hearing. If she is an unmarried woman who
has focuses and been successful in her career, and if she enjoys softball, she must be a
lesbian. If she is a lesbian and was appointed by Democratic president, she must be
politically liberal and therefore a judicial activist. If she is a judicial activist and if Don’t
Ask Don’t Tell policy was an issue during her tenure as Dean at Harvard Law, she will
rule based on her personal policy preferences which means a bias towards people like her
(read: homosexuals). If she is biased towards her personal preferences, she will legalize
same-sex marriage, and so forth. By utilizing one photograph and running it on the front
page of a major American newspaper, shortcut stereotypes can lead to prejudgments and
prejudices based on heteropreferential norms (Fermino 2010, Washington 2010).
It is through this subtle crescendo that builds over time that witnesses before the
Senate Judiciary Committee are then justified in charging that the appointment of a
justice just as Kagan will lead to legislation comparable to an “orphaned eunuch.” Even
though Kagan had never been a judge, she apparently has the motivation. The only thing
missing is her ascension to a liberal Supreme Court full of judicial activists to provide her
with the weapon she needs to castrate legislation and threaten the stability of
heteropatriarchal society (Kagan 2010, day 4, 1:30:00).
While hyperbolic, it was the choice of sexualized language used by the witness,
Robert Alt of the Heritage Foundation, to deride and hopefully derail the appointment of
Kagan to the Supreme Court. To be fair, usage of such language resulted in scoffs and
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smirks from the people in the committee hearing room, as is visible in the video records
of the proceedings (Kagan 2010, day 4, 1:30:00). While colorful language in the extreme,
it illustrates the point made by all the rumors, gossip, and innuendo evident in the
circumlocution by some media outlets and the senators in their line of questioning. It also
served to reinforce the binarisms identified by Queer New Institutionalism.
Binarisms: a product of partisanship?
By using Queer New Institutionalism as the basis to studying Supreme Court
nominations, reinforced norms based on sexuality are identified and challenged. The
theoretical constructs which maintain these norms, binarisms, waver and the lines drawn
by them are blurred once under critical examination. This was demonstrated through
Senator Brownback’s appeal in both the Roberts and Alito nomination hearings to ignore
repeated precedent and overturn Roe v. Wade.
The nomination hearings are replete with reference to heteronormative behavior.
This is most notable in the continual dependence on baseball analogies. A male
dominated sport, it is America’s pastime. The majority wants a justice that will exercise
judicial restraint and will use neutral principles to reach objective decisions. It wants an
umpire to call balls and strikes. It wants a reasoned, judicially restrained, straight, white,
male. Not an umpire that will walk out onto the field and start playing the game for
themselves. Nor does it want a queer. Or an ethnic/racial minority. Or a woman. That is
the essence of the demands of the dichotomous pairings uncovered by a Queer New
Instititonalist approach, if they are allowed to remain unchallenged.
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The victims of these binarisms are the nominees themselves, as senators,
witnesses, and the media work to constrain them within the confines of the dichotomous
pairings. Using the association with the minoritized Other to raise suspicion in the hopes
of derailing the nominee in favor of one more in line with their policy preferences. The
nominees were forced, at times, to operate within the confines of the binarisms. Roberts
appealed to neutral principles, aligning himself with the dominant sphere of judicial
restraint in the face of the minoritized judicial activism. Alito accepted Hatch’s assertions
at the prevalence of judicial activism, responding that justices needed to be restrained.
Sotomayor disavowed her Wise Latina comments as a “rhetorical flourish that fell flat”
instead of trying to justify them. Kagan agreed that judicial restraint was needed in the
face of increasing activism. These binarisms were referenced by senators of both parties.
In comments his comments during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, Franken says he
favors judicial restraint but is worried that activism is on the rise (U.S. Senate 2009, 53).
However, not all of the nominees subscribe to these dichotomous views. Although
Sotomayor is forced to retreat from and downplay her Wise Latina comments, senators
also criticize her for admitting that she believes there is “no objective stance but only a
series of perspectives.” Senator Kyl uses her position in combination with his critique of
her Wise Latina comments to suggest she will use identity and desire, rejecting restraint
and reason, in her decision making. To refute this, Sotomayor depends on her record as a
judge. Despite comments that she made during various speeches, she has a judicial record
of 17 years to defend her position that she is a judge that adequately applies the law (U.S.
Senate 2009, 122-123).
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While sexualized language is used to reinforce binarisms, it was also used to
refute them, as Senator Specter did in using his term “flaming liberal” to offset the “arch
conservative.” He used the terms in reference to Alito, suggesting that if one had an
agenda to paint him as a judge one way or another, they would only need to be selective
in the cases they wish to use to demonstrate it. Specter uses the contrasting pairs to
denounce a perception of Alito that would place him resolutely in either category. By
using this language, he is simultaneously acknowledging the persistence of the binarism,
and also similar ones, and denouncing them as well.
Judicial restraint/judicial activism: to the exclusion of alternative approaches
It might be plausible to blame the nominees for allowing the dichotomous
constraints outlined by Burgess (1999) and Sedgwick (1990) to endure. Sotomayor was
refuted by Senator Kyl for stating that there is no objective stance to interpret the
Constitution (U.S. Senate 2009, 122). But even when senators themselves raise the
possibility that there is no objective stance, the nominees refute them.
Senator Whitehouse tried to raise the point that by noting an increase in 5-4
decisions released by the Supreme Court, mirroring the findings of Epstein and Knight
(1998) during Kagan’s nomination hearing. Kagan refuted his point and insisted that
judges do not make decisions based on their personal policy preferences as the academic
research suggests. Sotomayor and Alito both state that reasonable people can disagree
when presented with a set of facts, even judges (U.S. Senate 2006, 332; U.S. Senate
2009, 131).
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The increasing lack of consensus should make a reasonable citizen suspicious of
this explanation for the prevalence of split decisions from the Court, if only for the fact
that academic studies which attempt to explain how the Supreme Court justices operate
are thorough and convincing in their analysis and evidence. But the prerogative of the
nominees and justices to ignore such studies, such as Epstein and Knight’s (1998), may
insulate the Court and protect it from unnecessary criticism. However, this does a
disservice to American citizens who are removed from the Supreme Court. As an
unelected body removed from the democratic process, failure to refute the binarisms
reinforces the status quo (Burgess 1999, 205, 214). This is the same status quo that is
biased towards the dominant groups maintained by the previously identified dichotomous
pairings. It is the same status quo that seeks to keep the minoritized Others out of the
mainstream.
As Burgess predicted, a Queer New Institutionalist perspective will reveal the
logical inconsistencies once the theoretical binarisms are applied to the practical. This
occurred during Sotomayor’s nomination hearing, when her responses prompted Senator
Graham to suggest she was beginning to sound like a strict constructionist (U.S. Senate
2009, 135). By continually reinforcing the constraints of dichotomous pairs, namely
judicial restraint/judicial activism, the senators received responses cast in that mold.
Graham exhibited frustration with Sotomayor’s responses, perceiving them to be much
like what would be expected from a strict constructionist. This indicates that he perceives
that she is not a strict constructionist in reality. Sotomayor also disavowed the
implications of her Wise Latina comments and reluctance to further develop her prior
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comments about the lack of an objective stance in interpreting the Constitution
(Sotomayor 2009, 122-123). She fails to identify or develop an alternative outside the
established binarism of judicial activism/judicial restraint. The only available options are
for Sotomayor to respond to questions during the hearings in a way that appeals to the
senators seeking a judicially restrained jurist, or admitting to being a judicial activist
which would likely lead to rejection to the Court by the Senate. As predicted by Queer
New Institutionalism, the binarism forces an “intellectual impasse” to the detriment of
those that are served by the system, the citizens (Burgess 1999, 214).
There is also no indication that judges are not testifying honestly when they refuse
to openly reject the status quo that reinforces those binarisms. For example, during his
nomination hearing, Roberts rejects academic analyses. He tells Senator Grassley that he
believes judging in accordance with the rule of law follows a more “pragmatic” approach,
to the detriment of academic theories, stating that their “demands and nuances… are
dispensed with fairly quickly” (U.S. Senate 2005, 182). This is a view that has persisted
with Roberts even after he secured confirmation as Chief Justice. In a recent interview
with Supreme Court justices regarding legal writing, Roberts stated, “what the academy
is doing, as far as I can tell, is largely of no use or interest to people who actually practice
law” (Liptak 2011). For Chief Justice Roberts, at the very least, there is no need to stop
operating from the confines of the judicial restraint/judicial activism binarism, as he
remains a part of the dominant spheres identified by binarisms.
Implications for women and minorities
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Times have changed, and the status quo has evolved. Women do not have to act
within the constraints of outdated norms, as evidenced by the increase in female attorneys
and female judges and justices in the federal judiciary (U.S. Senate 2009, 561). The
persistence of binarisms, as identified by Queer New Institutionalism, shows that there
are invisible influences which attempt to impose the default assumptions and dominance
associated with certain groups, at the expense of outgroups. This was acknowledged
through the analysis of various behaviors throughout the nomination hearings.
Although it is a horrible insult to women to imply their inferiority for a variety of
reasons, accepting the format and structure of the nomination hearings as is does nothing
to refute the constraints of women as being members of a marginalized outgroup.
However, it could be argued that it serves women and associated outgroups to tolerate the
power structures at work within the nomination hearings, because if they are confirmed,
members of such outgroups will have attained a position where they can do more relative
good as compared to the relative injustice done by reinforcing stereotypes and
assumptions directed to the nominees through questioning. But, this would confirm the
suspicions of members of the committee, who speculate that nominees answer questions
in accordance with the expectations of the committee, merely to obtain confirmation.
Evidence of this would then confirm to those that support the confining binarisms to
continue to employ them to constrain normative behaviors.
Many of the actors involved in the hearing process signaled a frustration with the
disingenuous nature of the proceedings: they do not seem to reflect reality outside the
Hart office building where the hearings are held. Several senators, such as Schumer and
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Graham made comments during the hearings signaling their frustration with questions
going unanswered and nominees being vague, hedging, and obscuring their actual
political opinions on several issues (U.S. Senate 2005, 375; U.S. Senate 2006, 38; U.S.
Senate 2009, 135-136).
Conclusion
Approaching Supreme Court nomination hearings from a Queer New
Institutionalist perspective provides the opportunity to look at such events through a lense
that does not take underlying themes of sexuality and desire for granted. These themes
serve as the basis for our society and institutions (Burgess 1999, 200). By locating and
deconstructing the binarisms identified by queer theory, the theoretical constraints they
reinforce can then be applied in practical terms. They reflect an untenable power
imbalance, in which dominant ingroups rely on subordinate outgroups to maintain order.
This power asymmetry is unstable and bound to collapse. This is because of the
inevitability of individuals who will arise that are unable to be categorized and confined
by the preestablished binary pairs. The marginalized Other cannot be removed, and the
dominant spheres rely upon such individuals for their survival. For example, without the
homosexual there is no heterosexual identity. It is entirely dependent upon the existence
of the marginalized homosexual identity (Sedgwick 1990, 10; Butler 1990, 39).
When viewed in the pragmatic political forum of Supreme Court nomination
hearings, these dichotomous pairings fail, such as judicial restraint/judicial activism,
male/female, white/black, heterosexual/homosexual, democratic authority/individual
rights, reason/desire, etc (Burgess 1999, 204, 208, 217). Utilizing discourse analysis, the
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four most recent nomination hearings for Supreme Court justices were deconstructed to
identify the use of such constraints to reinforce preferred heteropatriarchal norms. The
identified dichotomous pairings reflect a default preference for dominant spheres of
influence. This acceptance of the mainstream position of the dominant spheres as
ingroups is challenged when under close examination.
The Supreme Court nomination hearings studied provided prime examples of how
the maintenance of heteropreferential norms proves unworkable. While appealing for
adherence to judicial restraint, senators needed to rely on the existence of judicial
activists in order to maintain the dichotomous relationship between the two. In the
apparent absence of such a marginalized Other, such as during the confirmation hearing
of Judge Alito, proponents were left without a focus and were thus forced to skirt the line
between the binarism. Republican senators, such as Brownback, who had previously
appealed and reinforced judicial restraint, were suddenly emotionally appealing for their
desire for an activist judge to enact his personal policy preference and overturn precedent
in overruling Roe v. Wade (U.S. Senate 2006, 462-464).
These binarisms fail to predict in the face of marginalized Others, who will
always arise (Butler 1990, 39), whether it is in the form of a white, male, conservative
senator expressing his desire to enact his personal policy preferences, or a single, female,
Supreme Court justice that fails to define herself within the construct of judicial
restraint/judicial activism. The failure of such binarisms to persist in practical terms
means that, in reference to the Supreme Court, senators will need to find new ways in
which to investigate the judicial temperament of nominees.
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But the persistent reinforcement of these norms may cause inaction just as much
as action. The president must choose a nominee that will pass confirmation by the Senate.
Further exploration into the decision-making of the executive would add strength to the
theory. If the president considers, but is reluctant, to nominate a justice who can
overwhelmingly be framed as a marginalized Other within the context of identified
binary pairings, Senators will be successful in continuing to frame the debate in such a
manner. It would prevent nominees that raise suspicions as not conforming to normative
expectations from ever being considered.
By looking beyond the identities of potential nominees, assumptions based on
appearances and superficial appeals to heteropatriarchal norms can be rejected in search
of their perspective regarding the Constitution. As an unelected, undemocratic body, the
Supreme Court rules over constitutional issues that affect all Americans (Burgess 1999,
205). It is the Senate’s duty to “advise and consent” in order to determine the judicial
philosophy and fitness of the president’s nominees (U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2). By
rejecting the constraints of established binarisms, the Senate can move closer to a critical
examination of nominees that is more satisfactory, accountable to the electorate, and
intellectually honest.
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